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As the housing market continues to recover from the foreclosure crisis, an opportunity arises to 
examine how different hart-hit neighborhoods have managed to recover. This is a two-part study 
that examines real estate investor activity among REO properties in the Chicago region. The first 
part consists of a qualitative inquiry consisting of interviews with investors who are active in 
Chicago’s Southland region. That is followed by an examination of the trajectory of real estate-
owned (REO) sales in the Chicago metropolitan statistical area from 2009 to 2013, roughly the 
first few years of the housing market recovery. Using a data set of property transactions, it tracks 
property sales to investors and owner-occupants, and examines the neighborhood characteristics 
that contribute to an investor’s decision to purchase an REO property. `Findings are consistent 
with previous studies in that investor activity is high in neighborhoods with higher proportions of 
African American and older residents. In addition, investors report that they consider 
neighborhood context to be more important than property condition when considering a 
property’s resale value and that they show a willingness to work with nonprofit or public actors. 
By understanding the neighborhood-level determinants of REO dispositions and the primary 
motivation of REO investors’ property selection method, planners can help promote an equitable 
recovery and greater housing stability within neighborhoods that experience a distinct housing 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
While the foreclosure crisis in the United States affected all metropolitan regions, its 
effects were not uniform across space. Some regions experienced high concentrations of 
foreclosures, while others remained relatively unscathed. Mass foreclosures and high 
concentrations of real estate-owned (REO) properties have produced many negative 
consequences for neighborhoods such as home construction (Hedberg & Krainer, 2012), housing 
tenure (Fisher & Lambie-Hansen, 2010), and home prices (Wassmer, 2011; Gangel, Seiler, & 
Collins, 2013; Ellen, Madar, & Weselcouch, 2014). While these negative effects will likely 
linger within some neighborhoods for years (Immergluck, 2014), the national foreclosure rate 
peaked in 2010, and the national inventory of REO properties peaked in early 2011 (CoreLogic, 
2014). Both have steadily declined with each passing year. While it is too soon to claim that the 
foreclosure crisis is over, it is reasonable to state that 2010 signaled the beginning of the “post-
peak” era of the foreclosure crisis, and a nascent housing market recovery. As the incidence of 
new REO properties fell, the opportunity arose to conduct a place-based analysis of how real 
estate actors responded to the deluge of mostly vacant REO properties, such as through 
interviews, or by gathering foreclosure and home sales data to examine spatial patterns of 
concentration and patterns of resale and reoccupation. Understanding neighborhood-level social 
and physical characteristics of REO properties that investors purchase, as well as the social and 
physical characteristics associated with high concentrations of REO properties will help planners 
understand how they can ensure neighborhood stability in the wake of a housing market 
downturn and recovery.  
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This is a mixed-methods study that explores the factors that have influenced REO 
property sales, with a focus on neighborhoods hard-hit by foreclosures during the housing market 
crisis that began in the mid-2000s. This study uses an explanatory sequential mixed methods 
design. First in the sequence is a qualitative section that examines how real estate market actors 
have responded to the spike in available REO single-family properties, and how they have 
influenced change within Chicago’s suburban Southland region, an area that had experienced 
some of the highest REO accumulation rates in the past decade. The key research question of the 
first part asks: What local conditions attract investment in REO properties, and do they differ 
from investment in typical (non-REO) properties?  
This section is followed by a quantitative section that examines single family REO 
property sales in the entire Chicago region and focuses on the social and physical neighborhood 
characteristics associated with the sale and with the purchasing party of REO homes in the 
Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The primary research questions are: 1) In the 
Chicago region, where has successful reoccupation of REO properties occurred, 2) What social 
or physical characteristics are associated with rapid and slow reoccupation rates? and 3) Where 
have investors and speculators been most active? This part examines sales of REO properties in 
the Chicago MSA from 2009 to 2014, a period that aligns with the first few years of the housing 
market recovery. By combining two datasets of home foreclosures and home sales, it models the 
probability that an REO property will be purchased by an investor or an owner-occupant, thereby 
identifying both areas and neighborhood characteristics associated with investor purchases. It 
also examines the relationship between the characteristics of the neighborhood within which a 
REO unit is located and the length of time that the REO property stays on the market.  
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This study seeks to better understand how neighborhoods are affected by national or 
regional economic shocks, and how private real estate actors react to such shocks. Additionally, 
this research suggests specific actions planners and policymakers can take to help ensure that 
neighborhoods that are hard hit by a housing market downturn and face a slow recovery process 
can do to ensure that real estate professionals who choose to invest in the neighborhood are the 
types of investors who produce positive neighborhood-level externalities. Through interviews, 
this study finds that investors heavily preferred neighborhood characteristics when seeking REO 
properties, and many said that the right neighborhood is more important than the right house. 
The results of the second, quantitative part of research find that REO properties in Census block 
groups with high nonwhite populations and older populations take longer to sell, in addition, this 
study finds that investors tend to purchase REO properties in largely African American 
neighborhoods, particularly in Chicago’s South Side and in the suburban Southland region.  
 
Purpose of Study: Towards a Theory of Neighborhood-Level Housing Recovery 
As the incidence of new REO properties falls, the opportunity arises to conduct a place-
based analysis of investor’s strategy when purchasing REO properties, the potential differences 
in the concentration of REO properties, and patterns of resale and reoccupation. Understanding 
the social and physical characteristics of neighborhoods with high concentrations of foreclosures 
and the social and physical characteristics of REO properties that investors purchase will help 
planners understand how to ensure neighborhood stability in the wake of a housing market 
downturn. The purpose of this study is to examine how the investors in these neighborhoods 
operate with regard to REO properties. Then, this study identifies areas within a metropolitan 
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region that have managed to greatly reduce their REO inventories, and those areas that have not. 
Finally, this study identifies the areas with high concentrations of investor activity. 
While variables such as home values and poverty rate are common indicators of 
neighborhood decline or negative growth (Leigh & Lee, 2005; Holliday & Dwyer, 2009), this 
study examines neighborhood recovery with a focus on the reoccupation of units that assumed 
REO status after the homeowners defaulted on their mortgage. Reoccupation is chosen as an 
important factor for neighborhood stability because many of the neighborhood-level externalities 
of the foreclosure crisis were directly related to the vacant status of the REO units, such as 
increases in visible blight and crime (Frame 2010; Lee 2010). The term neighborhood stability, 
while widely used in planning literature, currently lacks a concise, consensus definition, although 
most definitions point to factors such as stable housing prices, stable neighborhood tenure, the 
physical condition of properties, and neighborhood social conditions such as crime rate (Rohe & 
Stewart, 1996). Recent studies have shown that a concentration of vacant units will affect all of 
these variables in a way that reduces neighborhood stability (Mikelbank, 2008; Reid, 2010; 
Spader, et al., 2012). 
This study addresses several important questions that planners and policymakers will face 
when focusing on neighborhoods that are affected by high concentrations of REOs. These 
include the characteristics that contribute to a robust housing recovery, a greater understanding 
of the preferences of investors and households that purchase REO properties, how investors can 
contribute to or impede neighborhood stability, what types of local policies are effective in 
attracting positive behavior and impeding negative investor behavior, and how housing market 
recoveries differ between African American suburbs and other communities. Findings point to 
policy issues such as the characteristics that can help communities recover during a recession or 
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housing market downturn. The policy implications include how planners and suburban 
communities that may lack the resources of large cities can effectively mitigate long term 
damage from a housing market downturn, such as the relative effectiveness of code enforcement 
and maintaining an inventory of vacant units. In addition, by identifying the characteristics and 
motivations of the types of investors that contribute to neighborhood recovery, this study can 
point to the types of incentives that local governments can offer to attract these types of 
investors. 
Recent studies have found differences in post-foreclosure trajectories and different levels 
of investor activity between minority neighborhoods, such as between Hispanic neighborhoods 
and African American neighborhoods (Pfeiffer & Molina, 2013), and between African American 
neighborhoods and white neighborhoods (Hwang, 2015). But the variation of investor activity 
within different types of majority-minority neighborhoods has been largely unexamined. 
Furthermore, several studies have examined investor activity among foreclosed and REO 
properties (Herbert, Lew, & Sanchez-Moyano, 2013; Immergluck & Law, 2014; Mallach, 2014), 
but few studies have sought to understand the business models, expectations, and motivations of 
REO property investors. Understanding investor motivations is crucial for planners and 
policymakers who wish to ensure a rapid reoccupation of REO properties and reduce the 
negative externalities of REO properties. Real estate investors typically have access to capital 
that an owner-occupant buyer may lack, and are often more willing to renovate or refurbish a 
property in order to resell it. As such, real estate investors are a key component of neighborhood 
recovery as framed by the reoccupation of vacant units. This study will identify what planners 
can do to make purchasing REO properties more enticing to owner-occupants.  
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This study finds that investors consider neighborhood characteristics such as crime, 
vacancy, blight, and house size, as more important than individual unit characteristics when 
deciding whether to purchase a property and that investors are taking advantage of the rise in 
demand for single-family rentals. In addition, investors signaled a willingness to work with 
nonprofit or governmental agencies and programs, if they deemed them profitable or worthwhile 
in some way. Finally, investors reported growing increasingly involved in the single-family 
rental market, which has exploded in the initial years of the housing market recovery.   
 
Chicago's Housing Market: Where Large Metro Diversity Meets Rust Belt Stagnation 
The area of observation for this study is the 14 counties in the Chicago MSA. The 
Chicago region can offer many insights for studying REO dispositions. Like many regions in the 
Midwest and the Rust Belt, parts of Chicago were particularly hard hit by foreclosures and 
subsequent vacant REO homes. Like Detroit and Cleveland, the Chicago region experienced a 
stark increase in foreclosures in 2006, prior to the national emergence of the foreclosure crisis in 
late 2007 (Immergluck, 2009; Kotlowitz, 2009; Hopkins, 2013). Furthermore, Chicago’s housing 
market has lagged the national average of post-recession housing price recoveries (Hoffman, et 
al., 2015). Unlike recent studies of REO dispositions in Las Vegas (Mallach, 2014) and Southern 
California (Pfeiffer and Molina, 2013), Chicago’s housing stock in the urban core is older. The 
Chicago metropolitan area did not experience as large an accumulation in housing prices in the 
early 2000s. But Chicago also diverges from hard-hit Rust Belt cities like Detroit and Cleveland 
due to its size and diversity of its housing market, with areas in high demand and areas in low 
demand. Home prices in the Chicago region began to rebound in 2012, but the recovery has been 
uneven (Podmolik, 2013). In 2013, neighborhoods on Chicago’s North Side experienced 
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appreciation of about 13%, nearly matching the national average of 14%. This was attributed to 
competition for limited inventory (McMillan, 2013). But housing prices in the neighborhoods 
with the highest foreclosure rates remained far behind the region as a whole in 2014 (Institute for 
Housing Studies, 2015). As such, the Chicago region allows the examination the intra-regional 
processes of post-peak neighborhood transition.  
 
Definition of Terms 
This study employs an explanatory sequential mixed methods design that consists 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies. A mixed methods approach can synthesize findings 
from both types of methodological inquiries and offer insights that would not be possible if these 
two research methods were pursued independently (O’Cathain, et al., 2007). Because this study 
employs a mixed method approach, the concept of recovery should be able to work with a 
quantitative definition, such as in Curtis, et al. (2010), as well as a qualitative definition, such as 
in Runst (2010). This study will examine the trajectory of REO homes within different 
neighborhoods. The dataset used in this study allows for the identification of all properties that 
entered into real estate-owned (REO) status as the result of a foreclosure. Once all REOs are 
identified, it is possible to track subsequent property transactions. It is possible to discriminate 
between properties that received a foreclosure notice and were subsequently transferred to the 
original mortgage lender, and properties that received a foreclosure notice, but there was no 
subsequent transaction, possibly because the borrower was able to negotiate with the property 
lender. This is how REO properties were identified in the quantitative section. REO properties 
were considered as leaving REO status if a subsequent property transaction was made from the 
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mortgage holder to another party (transactions from one financial institution to another were 
considered as remaining in REO status).  
These properties can then be sold to a household who seeks to live in the unit, or to an 
investor who seeks to gain a profit from a future sale of the unit or by employing the unit as a 
rental property. As such, outside of demolition, planners should seek to make sure that vacant, 
REO units become re-occupied as quickly as possible. It is important to understand the factors 
that make REOs attractive to households and to investors. The quantitative aspect of this study 
posits that the length of time a real estate-owned (REO) property takes to sell and the nature of 
the party purchasing the REO may be linked to the characteristics of that community. This 
drawback is particularly apparent in the quantitative section, although the housing diversity 
index variable will reveal the relationship between single family REO resales and the overall 
level of housing diversity.  
A notable validity issue concerns the transfer of REO sales. This study assumes that REO 
properties and REO transfers to institutions mean that the house in question remains vacant. But 
many property management groups have purchased single-family REO houses for rental 
purposes (Freddie Mac, 2014). It is not possible to identify these REOs that are repurposed for 
rentals. But it is estimated that these rentals only amount to about 6 percent of all REO sales 
(Garrison, 2014). Still, the presence of these properties should be acknowledged in the study. 
Finally, sensitivity to the subject matter is important to ensuring that interview subjects 





Organization of Study 
The remainder of this study is organized into five chapters, a bibliography, and 
appendixes. Chapter 2 consists of a review of scholarly literature dealing with the uneven 
geography of REO properties, the effects of REO properties, the market for REO properties, and 
neighborhood change and recovery brought by the foreclosure crisis. Chapter 3 examines the 
factors that influence investors in purchasing an REO property. Chapter 4 examines the factors 
associated with the among of time an REO property spends on the market. Chapter 5 conducts a 
spatial analysis of REO concentration and investor purchases, while Chapter 6 contains the 
summary, conclusions, and recommendations of the study. This study concludes with a 






CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The following literature review focuses on five related aspects of housing market 
recovery: 1) the uneven geography of the foreclosure crisis, 2) the neighborhood-level spillover 
effects of foreclosures, 3) the market for homes that have gone through the foreclosure process, 
4) Investor Activity in REO properties, and 5) how planners and policymakers can help to 
facilitate neighborhood-level recovery.  
 
The Uneven Geography of Foreclosure and REO properties 
While foreclosures have affected every metropolitan region, their impact has been 
uneven, both between and within regions. Several studies have examined the social and physical 
variables that are related to concentrated foreclosures in an attempt to understand the links 
between foreclosures and other sociodemographic and physical variables. Examples of 
contributing factors that have been considered in the literature include urban form and intra-
regional location, race and ethnicity, household income, and growth pressures (Biswas, 2012; 
Chinloy, Hardin, & Wu, 2016; Dong & Hansz, 2016).  
Urban form, which is characterized by factors such as population density, building 
density, or street density, may play a role in foreclosures. For example, some studies found that 
neighborhoods within central cities have higher foreclosure rates in some regions (Immergluck & 
Smith, 2006; Pedersen & Delgadillo 2007), but evidence also exists that shows high foreclosure 
rates in suburban areas, particularly in outer suburban and exurban neighborhoods in other 
regions (Immergluck, 2009). Longer commutes have been shown to have a positive relationship 
with foreclosure (Immergluck, 2009) as well as suburban neighborhoods with fewer transit 
 
11 
options (Henry & Goldstein, 2010), while lower foreclosure rates have been linked to greater 
walkability (Gilderbloom, et al., 2015). Attempts to revitalize inner-ring neighborhoods have 
long touted their locational advantage as “halfway to everywhere.” (Hudnut, 2003).  But Anacker 
(2015) found that in the 100 largest metropolitan areas, mature suburbs have foreclosure rates 
similar to central city municipalities. As such, it is unclear how location within the metropolitan 
region influences the purchase of REO units, as news reports and recent studies have highlighted 
both urban core areas (Coulton, Schramm, & Hirsch, 2010) and exurban neighborhoods (Lucy, et 
al., 2010) as suffering disproportionately from concentrations of foreclosures.  
Studies have also found links between social characteristics and foreclosures. Many 
previous studies have found that subprime lending, foreclosures, and the foreclosure REO market 
are concentrated within regions, particularly within low-income and minority neighborhoods (Li 
& Walter, 2013). Furthermore, because these neighborhoods often experienced high rates of 
foreclosure earlier, they lacked sufficient policy assistance to manage concentrated foreclosures 
(Immergluck, 2015). While several studies found that foreclosures were disproportionately 
concentrated in minority neighborhoods, Gilderbloom, et al. (2012) notes that in a study of 
Louisville, Kentucky not all African American neighborhoods were afflicted with high 
foreclosure rates. This indicates that racial composition is only one of several variables that lead 
to foreclosure clustering.   
Many existing studies have examined the concentration of REO properties in low-income 
and minority neighborhoods, although few have examined variation within these neighborhoods 
(Hwang, 2015). Recently, Hwang and Pfeiffer and Molina (2013) found variation in REO 
property sales in Southern California communities with high concentrations of Latino residents 
and high concentrations of African American residents and that investors were more active in 
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Latino neighborhoods with a large population of African American residents. The authors 
suggest that the Latino neighborhoods with high rates of sales may be voluntarily segregated and 
thereby will recover faster than low-income African American neighborhoods, highlighting the 
important differences between ethnic enclaves and segregated spaces (Marcuse 2005), 
particularly with regard to housing and investment. Furthermore, racial transition has taken place 
in many areas that were hard-hit by foreclosures.  
Previous studies have shown that minority neighborhoods have significantly lagged 
majority white neighborhoods in the nascent housing recovery (Li & Walter, 2013; Immergluck 
& Law, 2014; Hwang, 2015). The racial wealth gap has widened, and black homeowning 
households have not recovered as quickly as white homeowning households since 2009, 
ostensibly the year when the recovery started.  Reasons for this include the discriminatory and 
predatory lending during the 1990s and early 2000s that targeted African Americans and other 
minority groups that were historically excluded from the mainstream mortgage market and as a 
result, African American households paid higher interest rates. Furthermore, home equity 
accounted for a larger share of African American households than white households (Burd-
Sharps and Rasch 2015)  
Inter-regional comparisons of neighborhood health, desirability, or recovery are 
complicated and require qualification. For example, some regions hit hard by foreclosures such 
as Las Vegas and Miami, experienced an intense appreciation in home values from the mid-
1990s to about 2007 (Mallach, 2010). Other regions that were also hit hard by foreclosures, such 
as Detroit and Cleveland, did not experience much home price appreciation at all (Ford, et al., 
2013). As a result, neither inter-metropolitan nor intra-metropolitan housing price changes can be 
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used as comprehensive and reliable indicators of relative neighborhood recovery. This is 
particularly true in a region like Chicago, which is characterized by several housing submarkets.  
While understanding the physical characteristics and spatial patterns associated with high 
foreclosure rates is important, understanding the changing nature of these neighborhoods in the 
immediate wake of the foreclosure crisis is equally important, as it offers insight on how 
planners and policymakers can develop policies and tools that mitigate the negative effects of 
REO properties and accelerate the reduction of vacant REO properties in neighborhoods with 
high concentrations of them. Policies originally focused on selling foreclosed properties to 
owner-occupants. But that is not feasible in neighborhoods with a large concentration of vacant 
REO properties (Hwang, 2015). As such, identifying investors who have shown patterns of 
adequate property maintenance could contribute to better neighborhoods stability.    
 
REO Properties and External Spillovers 
The negative effects of foreclosures have been felt at the national, state, and regional 
levels, but the impact of concentrated foreclosures at the neighborhood level require a particular, 
focused attention. Several studies have found evidence that foreclosures have negative spillover 
effects at the neighborhood level (Mikelbank, 2008; Johnson, et al., 2010; Gerardi, et al., 2012; 
Hoskin, 2012). Additionally, recent studies have found evidence that foreclosures exhibit a 
clustered pattern. Gupta (2016) found evidence of a contagion effect with regard to mortgage 
defaults, where the foreclosure of a single property can exacerbate foreclosures of nearby 
properties. Previous studies have also shown that the negative effects of foreclosures will 
decrease with distance (Mikelbank, 2008; Whitaker & Fitzpatrick, 2011). 
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The most common focus of prior studies that consider the neighborhood effects on 
foreclosures has been on home prices (Immergluck & Smith, 2006; Frame, 2010; Gangel et al., 
2013). High concentrations of REO properties have been shown to decrease nearby property 
values (Immergluck & Smith, 2006; Gangel, et al., 2013), are a popular instrument of assessing 
neighborhood quality and desirability, and are often used as a proxy for those values. This is 
largely because home prices are relatively more accessible than other variables that may indicate 
a neighborhood’s overall health. Frame (2010) reviews the literature on the impact of 
foreclosures on surrounding home values and home sales prices and finds a large variation in the 
calculated magnitude of the impacts. This may be explained by data limitations and differences 
in methodologies, such as repeat sales and hedonic models. In moderate and high poverty 
neighborhoods, home prices are likely to appreciate less than in low poverty neighborhoods 
(Bostic & Lee, 2009). This makes assessing recovery within a region difficult, as regions are 
stratified by race and economic class. Home prices in moderate- and high-poverty neighborhoods 
may not appreciate at the same rate of low-poverty neighborhoods (Bostic & Lee, 2009), but 
they may show other signs of recovery, such as an increase in the number of owner-occupant 
households or a decrease in the number of vacant structures or blighted structures. 
While studies of home price changes offer insight into neighborhood health and 
desirability, home prices only provide one window into the overall health and well-being of a 
neighborhood, or of a neighborhood’s recovery because they only point to one aspect of 
neighborhood change. For example, recent studies have also found a link between concentrated 
foreclosures and reduced levels of new home construction (Hedberg & Krainer, 2012), and shifts 
in housing tenure (Fisher & Lambie-Hansen, 2010), important factors that cannot be captured by 
analyzing prices alone.   
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The negative externalities of vacant REO properties are largely viewed as the result of 
REO properties in poor and deteriorating condition (Gerardi, et al., 2012). Poor management of 
REO properties by institutional owners can exacerbate negative effects on the surrounding areas 
through visible signs of distress such as neglected lawns, boarded windows, and peeling exterior 
paint (National Fair Housing Alliance, 2012). Vacant units are also vulnerable to vandalism and 
theft (Mikelbank, 2008; Whitaker & Fitzpatrick, 2011). High foreclosure rates can also reduce a 
city’s tax base and vacant properties can absorb municipal resources when cities must maintain 
them (Apgar & Duda, 2005; Coulton, et al., 2008; Alm, Buschman, & Sjonquist, 2014).  
While studies that link foreclosures to social and physical variables have been abundant, 
few studies have been able to examine the links between these variables, foreclosures, and 
recovery. As such, there is a gap in our understanding of how the height of the foreclosure crisis, 
as well as its immediate aftermath, has impacted neighborhood change. 
The concept of location affordability captures important aspects of the built environment 
and human behavior that is not readily apparent when just looking at the socioeconomic and 
physical characteristics of a neighborhood. Location affordability acknowledges that housing and 
transportation costs are linked with access to broader opportunities, and that these factors should 
be considered together when assessing a neighborhood’s or a housing unit’s price or desirability 
(Center for Transit-Oriented Development, 2006). The Location Affordability Index (LAI) 
developed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the US 
Department of Transportation (USDOT) estimates household housing and transportation costs at 
several geographic levels that are based on a range of data derived from the US Census Bureau 
and the American Community Survey. Although the LAI is a recently-developed tool, the 
relationship between transportation and housing has been well established (Hirsch, 1998). For 
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example, the monocentric city models of Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth (1969) posit 
that when seeking a place to live within a metropolitan area, households will consider the 
tradeoff between housing and transportation costs. The underpinning of these spatial economic 
models, as well as more recent ones such as Glaeser’s (2008), is that transportation costs will 
increase with a household’s distance from either the city center or from another employment hub 
within the region. At the same time, these models assume that house prices fall as distance from 
the city center increases (Bajic, 1983; So, Tse, & Ganesan, 1997). These are the basic concepts 
that describe the tradeoff between housing and transportation costs, such as ‘drive ‘til you 
qualify.’ But they have recently received more nuanced operationalization within the context of 
housing accessibility. Several recent studies have attempted to quantify transportation costs 
alongside housing costs (Center for Transit-Oriented Development, 2006; Lipman et al., 2006; 
Currie & Senbergs, 2007; Mattingly & Morrissey, 2014). These studies note that transportation 
costs can amount to a substantial portion of a household budget, and can strongly influence 
household location decisions. Furthermore, transportation costs for households are “hidden” in 
that gas, vehicle maintenance, and other costs are typically not included in calculating housing 
costs (Thompson, 2013). 
 
The Market for REO Properties 
The resale of foreclosed homes is an important issue for neighborhoods hard-hit by 
foreclosures. Aside from demolition, the re-occupation of foreclosed homes is the only way to 
reduce the negative effects of an REO property. Li and Walter (2013) found that the REO market 
is highly segmented. In their study of REO sales in Boward County, Florida, they find that larger 
African American and Hispanic populations are related to a decreased probability of an REO 
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property’s sale, while the percent of owner-occupants in a neighborhood increase the probability 
of sale. The purchase of REO homes by investors, those who are seeking to earn a profit from a 
unit, has emerged as an important issue within neighborhoods (Herbert, et al., 2013; Pfeiffer & 
Molina, 2013; Ellen, Madar & Weselcouch, 2014; Immergluck & Law, 2014). These studies 
have confirmed that investor interest in homes can affect neighborhoods. There has been a large 
amount of interest in the sale of foreclosed properties to large, institutional investors, although 
recent studies have found that small-scale “mom-and-pop” investors accounted for a greater 
number of REO purchases overall. Furthermore, Mallach (2010) identified different types of 
investors, all of which can have different effect on their neighborhoods. For example, some 
investors rehabbing properties before reselling, while others put little in the way of capital 
investment and focus on quickly finding a buyer.  
The foreclosure discount concept has also received attention during the most recent 
housing crisis. The “discount” is the estimated sale value that a foreclosed property loses solely 
on account of being a foreclosed unit.  Some characterize the discount’s existence as a result of a 
stigma related to foreclosed properties, or the issues involved with a toxic title. Rutherford, 
Rutherford, Strom, and Wedge (2016) found that the subsequent sale of an REO property 
eliminates any foreclosure discount realized by the REO purchaser. This indicates that investors 
purchasing REO properties at steep discounts based on their status as a formerly foreclosed 
property have the opportunity to see substantial gains from a resale. The authors hypothesize that 
the foreclosure discount for a homebuyer may more often be the result of a foreclosed property 
characterized by poor maintenance. For the typical single family property, constant investment is 
required to counteract property depreciation. Because households that foreclose are often in 
financial distress in the months and years prior to a foreclosure event, many fail to maintain their 
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properties. As such, the foreclosure discount may be due to accelerated depreciation as a result of 
deferred upkeep (Gyourko & Tracy, 2006). But while recent studies have explored investor 
activity in purchasing foreclosed homes (Immergluck, 2010; Herbert, et al., 2013; Pfeiffer & 
Molina, 2013), a lot about the motivations, plans, and actions of REO investors is still not 
understood. An analysis of property transactions can reveal the location and amount of REO 
properties purchased by investors, but little is known about the property preferences of investors 
and their actions between buying and selling an REO property. It is therefore, critically important 
to understand investor activities, because investors can increase or reduce neighborhood 
recovery.  
Another important factor in REO sales is the property owning institution. GSEs, privately 
held corporations created by the federal government such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
operate with the goal of increasing the number of moderate-income homeowners with access to 
mortgages and reducing risk for housing investors. In the wake of the housing crisis, GSEs have 
come to possess many REO properties. Due to their mission of acting with the public interest in 
mind, these institutions typically have different disbursement standards than privately-owned 
REO holders. For example, the Federal Housing and Finance Agency recommends that GSEs 
should attempt to maximize financial recovery of a property while minimizing the negative 
effect of a foreclosure on the surrounding neighborhood (Hopkins, 2013). As another example, 
Fannie Mae created the First Look program, which gives owner-occupant households the first 
opportunity to bid on REO properties, bypassing institutional investors.  
 
Investor Activity in REO Properties 
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Investor purchasing of REO properties has emerged as an important issue within 
neighborhoods hard hit by foreclosures. Previous studies have examined patterns of investor 
activity in Boston, (Herbert, Lew, & Sanchez-Moyano, 2013), New York, Miami (Ellen et al., 
2014), Atlanta (Ellen et al., 2014; Immergluck & Law, 2014b), Southern California (Pfeiffer & 
Molina, 2013), and Las Vegas (Mallach, 2014). Overall, these studies found that investor activity 
can influence housing recovery at the neighborhood level. In some cases, neighborhood recovery 
has been impeded by investors who purchase properties and leave them unused in hopes of 
appreciation in the distant future. Recent studies have also found that many REO properties in 
distressed neighborhoods have been offloaded by institutional owners at bargain prices to out-of-
town speculators or those who otherwise have little knowledge of the property or its surrounding 
neighborhood (Coulton, Schramm & Hirsh, 2008; Ford et al., 2013). This occurs because 
institutions that own REO properties are often eager to sell as quickly as possible, especially in 
high-poverty neighborhoods, where the chances of price increases are slim (Mallach, 2010). In 
other cases, neighborhoods suffer when investors purchase distressed units and milk them (by 
turning them into rental properties), and conduct little or no maintenance and avoid paying 
property taxes, while racking up major code violations (Mallach, 2010; Treuhaft, Rose, & Black, 
2011).  
While real estate investor activity is often characterized as producing negative 
neighborhood externalities through activity such as lack of property reinvestment and 
maintenance, certain investor activity may be beneficial for neighborhoods. Investors may 
purchase distressed REO properties or properties in high-poverty neighborhoods that mortgage 
lenders may be unwilling to finance for owner-occupied households (Herbert et al., 2013; 
McSherry, 2010). In addition, investors are more likely to buy distressed homes than owner-
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occupant households are, who tend to seek properties that will require little or no immediate 
renovation. There is evidence that investors will renovate properties if there is a financial 
incentive to do so (Immergluck & Law, 2014a) and, in some cases, may even reduce the number 
of vacancies in distressed neighborhoods (Mallach, 2010). Mallach (2010) notes that it is 
important to distinguish between investor activity in housing markets with strong and weak 
demand, although Chicago as well as Chicago’s Southland region represent a large and relatively 
diverse market which features characteristics of both (Immergluck, 2010). Consequently, it is 
important to examine investor activity patterns within a region and how neighborhood 
differences may influence the presence of investors. Recent studies have confirmed that these 
variations exist. Ellen et al. (2014) found that investors in Atlanta were more active in 
neighborhoods moderately hit by foreclosures as opposed to those with the highest foreclosure 
rates. In contrast, investors in Miami and New York City, were most active in neighborhoods 
with the highest foreclosure rates. Herbert, Lambie-Hanson, Lew, and Sanchez-Moyano (2013) 
found that investors in the Boston region were most active in neighborhoods with high 
foreclosure rates. Ford, et al. (2013) and Reid (2010) examined Cleveland and Western 
metropolitan areas, respectively, and found that investors avoided central-city neighborhoods and 
tended to purchase properties in suburban locations.  
As the foreclosure crisis exacerbated, concerns grew regarding the role of investors in the 
purchase of REO and other foreclosure-related properties (Coulton, Mikelbank, & Schramm, 
2008; Mallach, 2010). But few studies have been able to thoroughly examine the business 
models of investors. Still, there have been several important recent studies that have examined 




Investors purchased large numbers of REO properties during and in the immediate wake 
of the foreclosure crisis. Immergluck (2012) found that in Atlanta from 2005 to 2009, nearly 
40% of all REO properties were purchased by investors. Furthermore, most of the low value 
properties (defined as selling for less than $30,000) that entered the market during that period 
was purchased by investors. Similarly, Ellen et al. (2013) found that from 2006 to 2010, 
investors in Atlanta, New York City, and Miami were more likely to purchase low-value 
properties than non-investors. In a study of Los Angeles, Pfeiffer and Molina (2013) found that 
investors were also more likely to purchase properties in low-income and predominantly African 
American neighborhoods. In addition, investors were more likely to purchase REO properties in 
neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates. These findings indicate that investors in a range of 
different regions and in different contexts are purchasing REO properties in distressed and low- 
and moderate-income communities. In addition, Ellen, et al. (2013) found that investor 
purchasing patterns moved from low-income to middle-income neighborhoods as the housing 
crisis matured, possibly reflecting the shift in new REO properties as the housing crisis grew to 
encompass a wider portion of homes.  
The business strategies that investors use to profit from REO properties are not very well 
understood. Fundamentally, when buying a property, an investor will adopt one of two choices: 
buy-to-sell or buy-to-rent. Mallach (2010) identified different buy-to-sell and buy-to-rent 
strategies pursued by single-family property investors. They include flipping, rehabbing, 
milking, and holding. Within the buy-to-sell strategy are “flipping” and “rehabbing” methods. 
Here, some flippers exhibit predatory behaviors, such as reselling the property quickly, ideally at 
a significantly higher price without conducting any significant rehab or other capital investment. 
Flippers may also search for properties that are in generally good condition and make some 
 
22 
modest improvements such as replacing the heating and cooling system or appliances, costing 
under $10,000 and then look to sell the home quickly. In contrast, the rehabber identified by 
Mallach also pursues a buy-to-sell model but will invest more resources in the property to make 
it attractive to another owner-occupier or investor.  
Flippers were identified by Ellen et al. (2013) as investors who resell properties within 12 
months of purchasing. They found that in 2011 in Atlanta, flippers accounted for 10% of all REO 
purchases. In contrast, the rate of flippers as purchasers of all REO properties in New York City 
was 40%. The Urban Strategies Council (2012) examined REO sales in Oakland, California and 
found that only a small percentage of investors were flippers, while Pfeiffer and Molina’s (2013) 
study of Southern California found that over 80% of REO properties purchased by an investor 
were flipped. The discrepancy in flipping rates may point to the relative strength of the housing 
market, as Southern California’s market was strong at the time.  
Along with buy-to-sell investors, Mallach identified buy-to-rent as the other primary 
investor sales model. As in buy-to-sell, there are two basic types of buy-to-rent investors, one 
that broadly produces positive externalities and one that broadly produces negative externalities. 
The “holder” types will rent their properties but expect the most significant return from selling 
the property at some point in the future, usually more than three years. Other holders may expect 
greater return from renting, although they generally plan on holding the property for a longer 
period. Holders generally maintain their properties to a minimum acceptable standard to ensure 
property value appreciation or at least very small depreciation. 
Milkers focus primarily on return generated from renting the unit and expect to see little 
return for future resale. Milkers are not concerned with keeping a property in a minimal 
acceptable operating condition, such as by the standards of local codes and ordinances. Milkers 
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may even abandon a property once it reaches a condition where it becomes impossible to find a 
tenant. These characteristics mean that properties owned by milkers are likely to produce 
negative neighborhood-level externalities.   
The size of an investor’s portfolio may indicate how the investor will deal with a property 
in terms of profit model, maintenance, and other factors. In most urban areas, small investors 
owned most of single-family rental properties (Garboden & Newman, 2012). Smaller investors 
tend to lack an excess amount of capital, as well as easy, reliable access to credit. Furthermore, 
their net operating income is typically not great enough to withstand increases in expenses, 
making expansion difficult. Ellen at al. (2013) found that small investors (defined as investors 
purchasing fewer than 10 properties over 10 years) accounted for the majority of investor 
purchases in Atlanta, Miami, and New York City from 2002 to 2011, although over time larger 
investors grew more prominent. While the majority of REO properties are still largely purchased 
by small investors, larger investors have increasingly played a larger role, particularly within 
certain housing markets or housing submarkets. In Oakland, the Urban Strategies Council (2012) 
found that the 30 largest buyers accounted for 80% of all REO property transactions. 
Additionally, Pfeiffer and Molina (2013) found that large investors were concentrated in high 
poverty neighborhoods, African American neighborhoods, and Latino neighborhoods. 
 
Neighborhood Recovery and Neighborhood Change 
Most often, the concept of recovery in the planning literature is discussed within the 
context of a natural disaster. But even within this field of literature, the definition of recovery can 
vary. For example Curtis, et al. (2010) defined recovery in New Orleans neighborhoods after 
Hurricane Katrina by assessing the number of damaged houses that had been refurbished and 
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returned to habitable conditions. In contrast, Runst (2010) examined recovery in New Orleans 
neighborhoods after Katrina via the re-establishment or the creation of new neighborhoods social 
networks.  
With regard to the foreclosure crisis, Pfeiffer and Molina (2013) examined the relative 
rates of neighborhood recovery in majority-Latino neighborhoods in Southern California, many 
of which experienced high rates of foreclosure. In this case, recovery was defined as the relative 
rate of REO sales to non-institutional owner-occupiers as it was assumed that neighborhoods 
with a high concentration of individual homebuyers indicated desirable, recovering 
neighborhoods. Johnson, Turcotte, and Sullivan (2010) identified the sale of foreclosed homes to 
nonprofit or community organizations as essential to recovery in foreclosure-stricken 
neighborhoods, as it was assumed that the strategic selection of these homes for redevelopment 
indicated neighborhoods with a higher potential for recovery. These varying definitions highlight 
that the term “recovery” must be adequately operationalized.  
A quantitative analyses of recovery will focus on variables such as new residential 
construction. Qualitative analysis of recovery might focus on why people choose to take part in 
the neighborhood recovery process (Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2009). Hwang (2015) studied 
hard-hit neighborhoods within Boston from 2006 to 2011. In this study, recovery was 
operationalized by tracking the trajectories of foreclosed properties within neighborhoods with 
the highest foreclosure rates. Investors are more likely than owner-occupants to purchase 
foreclosed properties in neighborhoods with larger percentage of African Americans, even when 
controlling for housing and neighborhood socioeconomic variables (Immergluck, 2014). Owner-
occupants were more likely to purchase properties in neighborhoods that were less than 50 
percent African American. In addition, investors in Boston were more likely to purchase 
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foreclosed properties in neighborhoods with a greater percentage of foreign-born residents. On 
one hand, investors can impede neighborhood recovery by purchasing REO homes and neglect 
them or otherwise leave them unused in hopes of value appreciation in the distant future. Some 
investors purchase REO properties with the goal of “milking” them by turning them in to rentals, 
conducting little or no property maintenance (Mallach, 2010; Treuhaft, et al., 2011). On the other 
hand, investors may provide a catalyst for neighborhood recovery, as they have the capital and 
expertise to renovate distressed properties that are of little interest to owner-occupant buyers 
(Mallach, 2010; McSherry, 2010, Herbert et al., 2013).  
Examining changes in home values is often employed as a method for understanding the 
extent of a neighborhood recovery. Raymond, Wong, and Immergluck (2015) found that African 
American neighborhoods in the Atlanta region--including low poverty neighborhoods--
experienced little to no price appreciation in the recent years following the peak of the 
foreclosure crisis while majority white neighborhoods experienced substantial appreciation. 
But the definition of recovery can be problematic, as it suggests a return to a desired 
status quo without questioning whether such a restoration is ideal (Strolovitch, 2013). A 
successful recovery can overlook inequalities that existed prior to a crisis. For example, a 
foreclosure recovery may very well overlook issues such as exclusionary zoning, a mismatch 
between housing supply and demand, and a resurgence in risky mortgage lending practices. 
Sadors (2013) combines an analysis of recovery in Los Angeles neighborhoods based on 
vacancy rates, property value changes, and the number of occupants per room. These findings on 
neighborhood recovery are combined with a qualitative analysis of local housing policies and a 
neighborhood’s capacity to increase housing diversity or construct accessory dwelling units. This 
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is because the research questions surrounding resilience and recovery emphasize process and 
outcomes, respectively. 
Mallach (2009) notes that vacant REO properties are only a symptom of neighborhood 
distress. The underlying cause of the distress is a lack of resident and homebuyer confidence in 
the neighborhood. The solution to this issue is a market recovery. He argues that a multifaceted 
approach is important to restoring confidence in most neighborhoods. This requires input from 
nonprofit and place-based community development corporations (CDCs), local government code 
enforcement, marketing campaigns aimed at homebuyers, neighborhood infrastructure 
improvement projects, social capital development, and crime prevention.  
In summary, concentrations of foreclosures can produce a range of negative spillover 
effects leading to neighborhood decline and abandonment. As the number of new foreclosure 
events continue to decrease, it will be important to examine the differences in the relative 
recovery rate within these hard-hit neighborhoods and identify the variables that appear to lead to 
a speedy or a delayed recovery. Furthermore, the large number of REO properties on the market 
in many cities presents the opportunity for increasing access to homeownership. But 
neighborhood affordability factors, such as housing and transportation costs, may not align with 
the most desirable neighborhoods for low- or moderate-income households. Finally, 
understanding the patterns of investor activity within a metropolitan region can provide insight 





CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This study employs a mixed methods approach, using two main datasets. The first dataset 
used is the response from a sample of investors to identify characteristics or geographical areas 
where they prefer to purchase REO properties. The second is a dataset of all foreclosures and 
home sales within the Chicago MSA from 2005 to the end of 2014. 
The three aims of this study are to: 1.) understand the local conditions that investors favor 
when purchasing REO properties; 2) Identify areas where REOs have been resold to real estate 
investors; and 3) Examine characteristics associated with REO properties that take a long time to 
sell or remain unsold. Each of these three questions is addressed in a subsequent chapter. A 
sequential, explanatory mixed methods design that appears in Figure 3.1 was used to complete 
these three aims. Qualitative data was collected in the first part, with results presented in Chapter 





Figure 3.1 Study Process 
 
 
The first part of this study examines investor activity in Chicago’s Southland region. Most 
neighborhoods in this region experienced a substantial racial transition since 1980. Recent 
studies have found that African American neighborhoods have not recovered at the same rate as 
white neighborhoods in the wake of the foreclosure crisis (Hwang, 2015). 
The first part of the quantitative section conducts an analysis of the Chicago region based on 
neighborhood type to find spatially-concentrated areas of stagnation and recovery based on the 
time it takes REO properties to sell. The second part of the quantitative part assesses the 
relationship between the social and physical neighborhood variables and the neighborhood’s 
accumulation of REO properties during the peak years of the foreclosure crisis, differences in 
recovery outcomes between majority white and majority African American neighborhoods, and a 
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neighborhood’s ability to decrease its REO inventory in the early years of the housing recovery. 
The third part of the quantitative section examines the purchasing patterns of real estate investors 
and owner-occupant homebuyers to determine which neighborhoods, and which neighborhood 
characteristics, attract either group. The following sections describe the methodology for the next 



























Part 1: Qualitative Analysis  
Chapter 4: Who buys an REO Property? Interviews with Investors 
This chapter consists of interviews with real estate investors active in Chicago’s 
Southland region. As Figure 3.2 shows, Southland consists of an area directly south of the City 
of Chicago, bordered on the east by Indiana, to the west by Interstate 57, and by the southern 
border of Cook County in the south. The region has transitioned from majority white in 1980 to 
majority African American today. This transition coincided with the rise of the subprime 
mortgage industry in the 1990s, where lending firms explicitly targeted groups that had been 
excluded from the mortgage market with high interest loans (Cutts & Van Order, 2005; Phillips 
2010; Ashton, 2012; Faber, 2013). Many of these communities experienced high concentrations 
of foreclosures and a glut of REO properties (Bocian, Li, and Ernst, 2010; Immergluck, 2011). 
As Table 3.1 shows, the percentage of single-family REO events normalized by the total number 
of single-family units was nearly twice as high in Southland compared to the rest of the Chicago 
MSA. Also, the mean number of months for an REO property to sell was longer, and the percent 
of properties sold to investors was substantially greater than in the entire Chicago MSA. These 
statistics indicate that the housing crisis was particularly acute in Southland, and that real estate 
investors have been particularly active in the region. Recent studies have found evidence that 
African American neighborhoods hard-hit by a concentration of REO properties have recovered 
at a slower pace than other hard-hit neighborhoods (Pfeiffer & Molina, 2013; Hwang, 2015). 
This is likely due in part to the disproportionate loss of household wealth among African 
Americans during the recession (Burd-Sharps and Rasch, 2015) and new credit restrictions that 
have particularly affected the ability of moderate-income and minority households to obtain 
mortgages (JCHS, 2015). The Southland region was selected for this study because it represents 
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an area that the housing market crisis has impacted and will continue to impact in the near future. 
It will be important to understand how actors such as real estate investors have responded to 
changes in the housing market in these areas. 
 
 




Recent studies have found differences in post-foreclosure foreclosure trajectories and 
different levels of investor activity between minority neighborhoods, such as Hispanic 
neighborhoods and African American neighborhoods (Pfeiffer and Molina, 2013), and African 
American neighborhoods and white neighborhoods (Hwang, 2015). Furthermore, several studies 
Variable Southland Chicago MSA
Mean Months to Sale 29.88% 21.89%
Percent of Propreties Sold at Auction 2.30% 4.58%
Percent of Properties Sold to Investor 43.20% 29.36%
Percent of Properties Sold by a GSE 36.41% 35.70%
Total Population 397,056 9,512,618
2010 % African American 59.23% 18.04%
2010 % Hispanic 11.04% 21.50%
2010 % Over 65 12.46% 11.41%
2010 % Percent Households in Poverty 13.48% 11.27%
2010 % Homowners w/ Mortgage 63.58% 87.76%
2010 % Renters 29.76% 20.37%
Housing Diversity Index 0.49 0.50
REO events per single-family units (2005-2009) 0.38% 0.20%
Property Characteristics
Neighborhood characteristics
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau (2010), HUD (2014), and RealtyTrac (2014)
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have examined investor activity among foreclosed and REO properties (Herbert, Lew, and 
Sanchez-Moyano, 2013; Immergluck and Law, 2014; Mallach, 2014) but few studies have 
sought to understand the business models, expectations, and motivations of REO property 
investors.  
 Efforts to mitigate the negative impact of REO properties and other vacant units have 
primarily relied on local governments and nonprofits funding property rehabilitation and land 
banking and code enforcement. Both the Cook County Land Bank Authority (CCLB) and the 
South Suburban Land Bank formed in the wake of the housing market crash. The CCLB has a 
Homebuyer Direct Program that intends to offer vacant homes in need of minor rehabilitation to 
owner-occupants at below-market prices. It has also pursued targeted purchasing in some 
southland communities that experienced particularly high rates of vacant properties under the 
Micro Market Recovery Program, as well as an initiative to raze abandoned properties in the 
Southland city of Riverdale. In addition, beginning in 2014, several cities in the Southland region 
pursued more effective code enforcement strategies pilot program, such as landlord licensing, 
licensing fee rebates, and centralizing code enforcement between a few Southland cities.  
To identify investors, I first attempted to contact investors who were active in 
neighborhoods where REO activity was particularly high. While most of the block groups in 
Southland had experienced high rates of REO properties, there was a great deal of variation 
among these tracts in terms of housing market characteristics such as median home value, home 
size (as indicated by the median number of rooms), vacancy rates, and poverty levels. While this 
chapter focuses on a distinct subregion within the greater Chicago region, the variation in 
neighborhood housing conditions creates the opportunity to ask investors about their preferences 
for neighborhood characteristics or for particular neighborhoods themselves.  
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Investors were first identified for potential interviews by contacting those who had 
purchased several REO properties within Southland, obtained from the data used in the analysis 
of property transfer records used in previous chapters. This produced a list of investors who 
purchased REO properties in the Southland region from 2005 to 2014. Unfortunately, efforts to 
contact these investors failed. In most cases, the contact information was found via a state 
corporate registration database, a property records search, or with an internet search. But when a 
working phone number was found, calls were not returned. It was apparent that many of the 
investors no longer operated at their address or used the same listed phone number, if they were 
still working as investors at all. In another case, I identified news articles where investors were 
interviewed. I attempted to contact 14 investors identified through local news stories but was 
only able to successfully contact and interview two.  
I then reached out to local nonprofit and governmental agencies for interviews. Through 
interviews with employees at the South Suburban Mayor’s Association, a local 
quasigovernmental regional association, Genesis LLC, a local nonprofit housing investment and 
development company, and the South Suburban Land Bank and Development Authority, I was 
able to get interviews with five locally-based small-scale real estate investors. Using a snowball 
sampling method, I was able to secure interviews with an additional eight investors. Thus, fifteen 
local real estate investors were interviewed, along with nine additional interviews with local 
government officials or nonprofit employees who were involved with or had specialized 
knowledge of the Southland real estate market.  
All interviews were transcribed and their content analyzed using a latent content analysis 
technique (Hay, 2010). Interview responses were coded by theme (the interview questions in 
Appendix B are sorted into the primary themes used in this study). Then common responses 
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within these themes were identified by tallying the specific responses by interviewees. If more 
than five interviewees (more than a third of all investors interviewed) provided a similar answer, 
it was deemed a common enough opinion or data point and these responses were combined into a 
single text file for a final analysis of common investor practices, beliefs, or plans in order to 
better understand the range of responses or opinions regarding a topic. The goal of this section of 
the study is to identify patterns in the beliefs and activities of investors based on a relatively 
small sample. This is an inductive approach that allows for new hypotheses to be developed 
based on interview content analysis and pattern identification (Bernard, 2011).  
It is important to note that this sample of investors is not a random sample and is likely 
not a representative one. This will limit the power of the analysis and conclusions of this study. 
But the purpose of these interviews is not to gain knowledge about the total population of 
investors, as that is done in the quantitative analysis of the following chapters. While those 
reveal important geographic patterns of investor activity, the analysis of the quantitative chapters 
is limited in what it reveals about the decision-making process, business models, and goals of 
real estate investors who are engaged in purchasing REO properties. The sample of interviews 
collected is purposeful, with the goal of learning something about investor characteristics, such 
as investor size, geographical concentration, and business goals. But this sample does not 
represent the entire industry of REO investors engaged in Chicago’s Southland.  
Table 3.1 describes the investors interviewed here by capacity level. The size range 
among the respondents was large, with eleven small investors owning ten or fewer units. In the 
middle were two investors who owned less than 20 units, and two investors who owned 21 or 




Table 3.2: Investor Sample by Portfolio Size 
 
Small 




(Over 20 units) 
Investors 11 2 2 
 
 
While this study is focused on for-profit investors, two nonprofit investors were also 
interviewed. Nonprofit investors must operate in the same housing market as for-profit investors, 
so they share many of the same operational challenges of purchasing or investing in REO 
properties in distressed neighborhoods. Oftentimes, nonprofit investors must compete with for-
profit investors, although both nonprofit investors reported partnering with private investors at 
times as well. But most of this study focus on the experiences and behavior of private, for-profit 
investors.  
Most interviews were conducted in person, with four interviews conducted over the 
phone due to the interviewee preference. The interviews were semi-structured and lasted 
between 45 and 90 minutes, with most at around 60 minutes, as the interview protocol was 
designed to accommodate a 60-minute interview. There was an initial set of common questions 
was asked of all interviewees (see Appendix B), followed by a unique question set for for-profit 
investors, one for nonprofit investors, and one for government officials. For investors, the 
questions focused on capital resources and financing choices and options, their purchase and 
renovation costs for their properties, their operating costs and how those are calculated, and their 
expected operating returns. Other questions focused on their overall strategy and goals, property 
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management methods, their participation in government programs such as the Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program (NSP) or the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program. 
 
Part 2: Quantitative Analysis of REO property Sales 
 Research examining a homebuyer’s decision to purchase a property typically consider a 
broad range of factors, such as characteristics of the housing unit, purchasing power, expectation 
of resale values, and the nature of neighborhood amenities. Similarly, this chapter controls for a 
number of factors that may affect the time an REO unit spends on the market including 
neighborhood-level housing unit diversity, affordability, and access to transit.   
This study considers only sales of detached, single-family houses because other housing 
types, such as large and small multifamily units, are likely to follow different patterns of investor 
and occupant interest. They are more likely to be purchased exclusively by investors or property 
managers, which means that there is little to no competition between investors and owner-
occupiers. In addition, the neighborhood characteristics associated with the time a multifamily 
property spends on the market are likely different. For example, Cambell, Giglio, and Pathak 
(2011) find foreclosure externalities for foreclosed condominiums but not for single family 
properties, while Hartley (2011) finds that foreclosed multifamily units have no effect on the 
price of nearby properties, while foreclosed single-family properties do. This indicates that 
single-family properties are unique in the housing market and that the characteristics that affect 
their sale are different than other types of housing units.  
The primary unit of analysis is a sales transaction for a single-family housing unit, 
although Census block group-level data are used to control for neighborhood effects in a 
multilevel statistical model. Data on home sales and foreclosure events were obtained from 
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RealtyTrac, a real estate data information and analytics company. The two data sets are 
comprehensive and represent: (1) records of all foreclosure events from 2005 to the end of 2013 
and (2) property sales from 2009 to the end of 2013 in the Chicago MSA. The years 2009 to 
2013 for property transactions were chosen in order to better examine the impact of 
neighborhood effects in the immediate era of post-peak recovery, rather than at a time when 
foreclosures were steadily increasing and the housing market was still very weak. REO sales 
were identified by merging the data set containing all properties in the Chicago MSA that 
received a foreclosure notice from 2005 to 2013 with the sales data set from 2009 to 2013. In 
addition to REO properties, this study included all foreclosed properties that sold at auction to an 
investor or an owner-occupier. 
 
REO Sales Dataset and Variables 
Table 3.1 shows the variables in the model. Property-level characteristics such as the 
number of months to sell, the sale date, and whether a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) 
or another government institution such as HUD or the VA Administration sold the property were 
included as independent variables. GSE or government institution sellers were identified by a 
search through seller names for identifiable keywords such as Federal National Mortgage 
Association, FNMA, or Fannie Mae. Federal agencies heavily involved in the mortgage industry, 
such as the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs, were also included. Previous studies have determined that property 
characteristics such as condition and size are important to investors (Immergluck & Law, 
2014b). Unfortunately, property characteristics such as structure condition, lot size, home size, 
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and the number of rooms or the age of the house were missing from a large number of 
transaction records, so these variables could not be included. 
In addition, this study employs three key variables from HUD’s Location Affordability 
Portal to examine the effects of housing and transportation costs on the resale of REO properties. 
The first is the location affordability index (LAI), which determines housing and transportation 
costs as a percentage of total income for eight household types of varying size and economic 
status. In the LAI, three household types that would benefit the most from greater housing and 
transportation affordability and will be included in this study. The first is the median-income 
family, which assumes a household size of four people, two commuters, and an income that 
equals the median income for the region, in this case the Chicago MSA. Second is the single-
parent family, which assumes a household of two, one commuter, and a household income that is 
50% of the median income for the Chicago MSA. Third is the moderate-income family, which 
assumes a household of three, one commuter, and a household income that is 80% of the 
Chicago MSA median. The important LAI variables for this study are Census block-group level 
estimates for housing and transportation costs for each of the three household types. These 
variables are constructed from the 2009 American Community Survey 5-year estimates. Housing 
costs are determined by each household’s characteristics and the block group’s built 
environment, such as the number of owner-occupied units, the selected monthly ownership costs, 
and the total number of occupied units. Transportation costs are also determined by household 
characteristics and aspects of the built environment, such as estimated auto ownership costs and 
transit use costs. This study hypothesizes that higher housing and transportation costs for all 
three household type, as recent research and coverage of the Chicago housing market indicates 
that housing recovery has been concentrated in higher-priced neighborhoods (Janssen, 2016) 
 
40 
The third LAI variable used is the Employment Access Index (EAI). This variable 
calculates the number of jobs in nearby block groups. As such, it indicates the presence and 
accessibility of jobs within a census block group and may act as an indicator for employment 
opportunity as well as nearby economic activity.  
To examine the impact of neighborhood conditions, neighborhood-level characteristics 
were collected from the 2010 U.S. Census (2010) and the 2006–2010 American Community 
Survey (2010). These include social variables such as the African American population, the 
Latino population, the population over 65 years of age, the population in poverty, and the 
percentage of renter-occupied units. Previous studies have established that neighborhoods with 
aging populations could indicate places that are not in demand by younger households (Hanlon, 
2009; Vicino, 2008). In addition, the housing crisis has changed the tenure mix of many 
neighborhoods, inasmuch as units that were previously owner-occupied have been transformed 
into rentals. Furthermore, homeowners tend to avoid neighborhoods with a large proportion of 
renters, as homeownership is associated with greater neighborhood stability (Kremer, 2010; 
Rohe & Stewart, 1996). But whether REO purchasers prefer neighborhoods with a large share of 

















In addition, this study creates a variable that estimates the diversity of housing types in a 
Census block.  The housing diversity index (HDI) is based on the Simpson Diversity Index 
(SDI), which developed as an ecological indicator to measure species diversity and abundance 
Variable Description Source
Property Characteristics
Sale to Investor An REO single-family property purchased by a real estate agent
RealtyTrac
Month to Sale The number of months taken for an REO single-family property to sell
RealtyTrac
GSE Seller
A binomial variables indicating that the REO property was sold by a government-
sponsored entity such as  Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or the Veteran's Administration RealtyTrac
Neighborhood Characteristics
2010 % African American The percentage of African American residents in 2010
Census
2010 % Hispanic The percentage of Hispanic residents in 2010
Census
2010 % Over 65 The percentage of Over 65 residents in 2010
Census
2010 % Households in Poverty The percentage of households in poverty in 2010
Census
2010 % Homeownersn w/ Mortgage The percentage of Homeowners w/ a Mortgage in 2010
Census
2010 % Renters The percentage of Renters residents in 2010
Census
Housing Diversity Index (HDI) The mix of residential properties (100 = all same type; 0 = all unique housing types)
Census
2005-2009 Foreclosures/Unit The percentage of Foreclosur ain 2005-2009
RealtyTrac
Employment Access Index
The number of jobs within nearby block groups / the squared distance to the block 
groups HUD
Median Income Family Housing Costs
Estimated yearly housing costs for a two parent, two child family earning  the Chicago 
MSA's median income ($61,367) based on block group characteristics HUD
Median Income Family Transportation Costs
Estimated yearly transportation costs for two parent, two child family earning the 
Chicago MSA's median income ($61,367) based on block group characteristics HUD
Moderate Income Family Housing Costs
Estimated yearly housing costs for a two parent, two child family earning 80% of the 
Chicago MSA's median income ($49,094) based on block group characteristics HUD
Moderate Income Family Transportation Costs
Estimated yearly housing costs for a two parent, two child family earning 80% of the 
Chicago MSA's median income ($49,094) based on block group characteristics HUD
Single Parent Family Housing Costs
Estimated yearly housing costs for a one parent, one child family earning 50% of the 
Chicago MSA's median income ($30,684) based on block group characteristics HUD
Single Parent Family Transportation Costs
Estimated yearly transportation costs for a one parent, one child family earning 50% 
of the Chicago MSA's median income ($30,684) based on block group characteristic HUD
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within a prescribed area. Like the SDI, the HDI calculates the probability that two randomly 
selected housing units in the same block group will be of the same housing type. Examples of 
housing types defined by the U.S. Census Bureau include a detached single-family unit, an 
attached single-family unit, and a 2–4-unit structure. The HDI is determined as: 
 
D = ∑ 
(n(n − 1)) N(N − 1) 
 
where D is the HDI value, n is the number of one type of housing unit, and N is the total number 
of housing units in a census block group. The diversity of housing units may be important to 
REO disposition. Gilderbloom, et al. (2015) found that neighborhoods with high Walkscore 
values experienced significantly fewer foreclosures during the 2000s. The Walkscore variable is 
based on land use mix, building density, and street grid density. This suggests that areas with a 
greater mix of uses will experience fewer foreclosures, but that study does not explicitly examine 
housing unit mix. Multiple types of housing units can provide housing options for a range of 
households (Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, 2014). Additionally, neighborhoods 
with diverse housing stock provide better access or potential access to transit and foster 
employment centers (King & Hirt, 2008). The final explanatory variable is the block group-level 
foreclosure rate from 2005 to 2009. Foreclosure events were determined using the RealtyTrac 
foreclosure data set. This process identified all properties that received either a Lis Pendens, a 
notice filed in public record indicating that a lawsuit has been filed against the property, or a 
Notice of Sale document, which indicates that the property is slated to be publicly auctioned. 
Properties that receive these documents do not necessarily experience foreclosure, because 
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borrowers may be able to negotiate with lenders or otherwise avoid foreclosure after receiving a 
Lis Pendens document. Due to limitations of the data set, it was not possible to determine which 
properties actually resulted in foreclosure, but a neighborhood with a high concentration of 
foreclosure events still indicates neighborhood distress. This study also classifies each Census 
block group in this analysis by its respective location within the metropolitan area. Block groups 
in the central city of Chicago are classified as central city, while suburban block groups in 
municipalities that saw their greatest era of housing development prior to 1969 are classified as 
inner-ring suburbs. Block groups in municipalities that saw their greatest era of housing 
development between 1970 and 1989 are classified as outer-ring suburbs and block groups in 
municipalities that saw their greatest era of development between 1990 and 2010 are classified as 
exurbs. Finally, block groups that are not a part of any municipality are classified as 
unincorporated. Many studies have examined how foreclosures have impacted central-city, 
inner-ring suburban, and exurban neighborhoods (Anacker, 2015; Lucy 2010). Therefore, it will 















All REO transactions were geocoded and plotted using ArcMap Geographic Information 
System (GIS) software to determine their census block group, yielding a total of about 53,000 
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transactions. Roughly 5% of the transactions did not have geographic coordinate data and were 
removed from the data set. In addition, about 6% of the remaining properties took longer than 5 
years to sell and were removed from the data set based on the supposition that they represented 
highly unusual or severely distressed properties (i.e. outliers). This resulted in a final dataset of 
47,945 property transactions between 2009 and 2013 that were analyzed using multilevel logit 
regression to examine the trajectory of sales of for REO properties. 
 
Chapter 5: REO Properties and Time to Sale 
The model employed in this chapter is a discrete-time hazard-rate model, which 
examined the relationship between various neighborhood characteristics and the length of time 
an REO property took to sell for all sales from 2009 through 2013. This model determines the 
likelihood that an event will occur within a specified period of time. Unlike an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model, the discrete-time hazard-rate model can account for sales that happen at 




) =  𝛽 +   𝛽 (𝑋 ) + ⋯ +  𝛽 (𝑋 ) + 𝑏 𝐴  
 
where W is the probability of an REO property sale, X1 to Xn are the explanatory variables, and Ai 
are the dummy variables for the number of months that an REO property spent on the market. A 
sale at an auction, signified as 0 months, is the excluded variable. As this analysis covers the 5-
year period from 2009 through 2013, there are 60 time-related dummy variables. In addition to 
the roughly 48,000 REO properties that sold from 2009 to 2013, this model also includes about 
20,000 REO properties that entered the market from 2009 through 2013 and did not sell. A 
positive estimated coefficient β for an explanatory variable i would indicate housing or 
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neighborhood characteristics that are more likely to sell sooner, whereas a large negative 
coefficient β indicates a housing or neighborhood characteristic that is more likely to sell later. 
Coefficient estimates for the dummy variables b indicate the logarithmic difference of the odds 
of sale for a particular month relative to month 0, which represents a sale at an auction.  
 
Chapter 6: Examining where REOs Cluster, where Investors Cluster, and the Characteristics 
Associated with Both 
The Moran’s I test determines whether the spatial distribution of a variable is clustered or 
randomly distributed. A test of the REO event locations and the REO sales to investors indicates 
that spatial correlation exists for both variables. This means that it is possible to analyze the 
clustering of both variables and identify the areas with particularly high and low concentrations 
of REO properties and investor purchases. After that, this study conducted a Getis-Ord Gi* test, 
more commonly known as a hot spot analysis. A hot spot can identify statistically significant 
areas of concentration or dispersion (also known as ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ spots) by examining each 
variable within the context of its nearest neighboring variables, the analysis can delineate 
statistically significant areas where either REO events or REO sales to investors cluster. ArcGIS 
was used to create a map of the Chicago MSA that identified hot and cold spots for REO events 
and investor REO purchases. This allows for the identification of areas within the Chicago MSA 
that experienced particularly high or low concentrations of either variable. When employing the 
hot spot analysis, it was necessary to create a spatial weight matrix that identifies the area of 
spatial dependence. A queen-based contiguity weight matrix was constructed, as the block 
groups in this analysis. 
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In addition, this chapter includes a model that identifies the property and neighborhood 
characteristics associated with an REO property’s sale to an investor. Studies that examine a 
homebuyer’s decision to purchase a property commonly identify a broad range of important 
factors that will affect an investor’s or homebuyer’s decision to purchase a property. These 
include the characteristics of the housing unit, the buyer’s purchasing power, expectation of 
resale values, and the nature of neighborhood amenities. Similarly, this study controls for a 
number of these factors that may affect a household’s or an investor’s decision to purchase an 
REO property. However, this study is specifically interested in the role of neighborhood-level 
characteristics such as housing mix and affordability, and how these influence purchasing 
decisions by investors and homeowners.  
This study also employs a multilevel logistic regression to determine the characteristics 
that influence REO sales to investors. The explanatory variables that determine the probability of 
sale to an investor are observed both at the property level (time to sale, GSE seller) and at the 
block group level (such as the housing costs and transportation costs per household). The 
multilevel model will account for correlation between properties that are in the same census 
block group. A multilevel logit can account for this correlation as well as include a random error 






= 𝛽 +  𝛽 𝑋 + ⋯ + 𝛽 𝑋 +  𝑒  
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 2: ∝ =  𝑦 + 𝑦 𝑍 + ⋯ +  𝑦 𝑍 + 𝑢   




Where W is the probability that an REO property i in Census block group j is sold to an investor. 
𝛽  is the intercept for the Census block group, 𝛽 𝑋  to 𝛽 𝑋  are the property-level variables 
and their coefficients, and 𝑒  is the property-level error term. 𝑦  is the intercept for the entire 
population of properties, while 𝛾  is the slope for the entire population. 𝑦 𝑍  to 𝑦 𝑍  are the 
block group-level covariates, and 𝑦 𝑍  to 𝑦 𝑍  are the block group-level coefficients, and u 









CHAPTER 4: WHY BUY AN REO PROPERTY? EXAMINING THE CHOICES 
AND TACTICS OF REAL ESTATE INVESTORS 
 
As recent studies have shown, a common pathway for single-family REO properties to 
reenter the local housing market is by purchase from a private investor, who will either attempt 
to resell the unit or convert the unit into a rental property (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2005; Hwang, 
2015; Lambie-Hansen et al., 2015). The number of properties purchased by investors has 
increased since the early years of the housing crisis in the mid-2000s, suggesting that many real 
estate investors have adjusted to current market conditions and have incorporated purchasing 
REO properties into their business model. Nationally, REO property sales increased from less 
than 5% of all home sales in 2005 (to about 64,000 total) to peak at 29% in 2009 (or about 
109,000 total), while falling to about 8% in 2016, or about 45,000 sales (Boesel, 2017).  
The most recent analysis of REO properties purchased by investors in the United States 
was conducted in 2011 by Campbell/Inside Mortgage Finance as a survey of over 2,000 realtors 
in the United States. It found that about 24% of all “move-in ready” REO properties are 
purchased by investors, while investors purchase 59% of all “damaged REO” properties. In 
contrast, investors only count for about 10% of all “nondistressed” property sales. These are 
sales that are neither REO properties or short sales. This indicates that property investors are 
more concentrated in the REO property market than in the general residential property market.  
Alongside a growing investor interest in REO properties, the demand for single-family 
rental units has increased greatly. Malloy and Shan (2011) found that after experiencing 
foreclosure, 75% of households move to single-family units, as opposed to multifamily units. 
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These households are not likely able to access mortgage financing, which suggests that they are 
moving into single-family rental units and subsequently that many formerly owner-occupied 
units are being converted to rental properties. 
Single-family home investors have always been a prominent part of the housing market, 
but the great housing market disruption of the last decade has resulted in a substantial increase in 
the number of properties purchased by investors (Immergluck and Law, 2014). This is 
particularly true in neighborhoods that experienced high amounts of foreclosure activity. 
According to Chang, Tirupattur, & Egan (2011), a more restrained credit market, continuing 
income inequality, and other factors may push a substantial number of moderate-income 
households towards long-term rentership. Investors appear to be aware of this shift and are 
responding by increasing their portfolios of single family rental properties.  
The single-family property market in the United States has been historically dominated 
by small investors (Garboden & Newman, 2012; Mallach, 2010). But larger investors have 
increasingly entered the market, many of which have been funded by private equity. Many of 
these large investors operate with an intention to rent out the properties instead of selling them. 
In the wake of the recent upending market, this seems to further implicate a shift in housing 
tenure, especially in large metropolitan areas where these large investors are focused. 
These substantial changes in the real estate market have varied implications for urban 
planning and policy. In order to understand how policy can assist communities during a housing 
market recovery and a potential change in socioeconomic or demographic makeup, we must 
know more about the methods and activities of investors, with a particular focus on how investor 
activity affects distressed communities. This chapter examines these trends in the context of a 
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diverse housing market in the Chicago metropolitan area: Southland, or the suburbs directly 
south of Chicago in Cook County, Illinois.  
This chapter relies primarily on qualitative interviews to learn the decision-making 
process, methods, and models of investors who purchase previously foreclosed single-family 
homes. It uses Mallach’s (2010) typology of investor strategies to frame the actions of particular 
investors. By doing this, this study can identify iterations or outright departures from the existing 
typology of investors or new strategies adopted by investors as well to predict the types of 
properties that an investor may purchase to quickly flip, to hold in hopes of appreciation, or to 
rent. The primary research question of this chapter is: What local conditions attract investment in 
REO properties, and do they differ from investment in typical (non-REO) properties? 
The Southland region has seen large numbers of its single-family homes purchased by 
investors. This primary method of this transaction has been though the sale of REO properties to 
investors. The Southland region contains a range of communities, from low-income to affluent. 
This chapter is primarily concerned with properties in neighborhoods with high levels of investor 
activity. These tend to be in the more moderate-income neighborhoods of Southland, although 
substantial concentrations of REO properties could be found in all parts of the region. 
The investors interviewed represented a range of geographic coverage areas. One of the 
small investors had all owned properties in the same general neighborhood, while another 
reported to focus within three neighboring suburbs, and a third invested in both the more 
distressed suburbs bordering Chicago and the more affluent neighborhoods on the southern edge 
of Cook County. As expected, the medium and large-scale investors had larger geographical 
radii. Both medium investors and the one large investor focused on Southland as well as the 
neighboring southwest suburbs, which are predominantly White, while the other large investor’s 
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geographical scope extended from Southland to Chicago’s western suburbs, although primarily 
focused on suburban communities and little in the city of Chicago.  
The investors interviewed also varied greatly in their experience in real estate investing, 
their financial objectives, their funding sources, and their business models. This indicates that 
there is no real “blueprint” for investors, and that investor businesses operations typically 
develop as a reaction to local housing characteristics and developments. Again, these investors 
likely do not represent the entire universe of REO investors in Southland, but interview questions 
about these topics offered a variety of responses and highlighted the diversity of investor 
activities in this area.  
 
Investor Organizational Structure 
The private investors active in Southland must be strategic and adaptive in the way they 
structure their business and in the way they operate. All small and medium-sized investors 
reported difficulty accessing credit after the 2008 housing market crash, with only one medium-
sized investor reporting that they were satisfied with credit accessibility in recent years. Several 
noted that many community banks that served Chicago and the Southland region in particular 
had failed, with nothing to replace them. In addition, the housing market crash caused the 
subprime and alt-A lending industries to virtually disappear. Many investors report that other 
traditional credit sources, such as banks have become less interested in working with investors. 
As one investor noted about the ability of investors to get bank financing, “They have no interest 
in lending to smaller investors. It doesn’t matter what kind of collateral you have.” 
One large investor reported getting loans from local banks, but also noted that things like 
additional personal guarantees, additional collateral, and other aspects made it much more 
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difficult than before the housing market crash. Additionally, hard money lenders, who can 
finance things such as construction loans have become more conservative by requiring lower 
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs). Larger down payment requirements mean that hard-money lenders 
have reduced maximum LTVs to about 50%. This is a big change from the early 2000s, when 
hard-money loans could often be obtained with no money down.  
Only one of the large investors regularly accessed hard-money loans or bank financing 
for property acquisition or renovation as well as a loan from a hedge fund. Most small investors 
relied on personal funds, while some others also borrowed money from friends and family. Many 
were pursuing loans from individuals with savings that they would use to collateralize with the 
investment property.  
About half of all respondents, encompassing investors of all sizes reported regularly 
working with other investors. The most common collaboration activity was working with other 
investors as agents in acquiring properties. Other activities included hiring other investors for 
renovations or other property improvement projects. Some investors were in regular contact with 
out-of-state investors who initially connected with the interviewees through networking at local 
real estate investors association events or online, such as through Craigslist. Generally, small and 
medium-sized investors would work with other small- and medium-sized investors, while large 
investors would choose to work together.  
 
Property Identification and Selection Processes 
The investors interviewed in this study reported a variety of ways for identifying REO 
properties to purchase. Less than half of the investors interviewed purchased properties at the 
Cook County foreclosure auction, where recently-foreclosed properties are available to purchase. 
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If these properties don’t sell at the auction, they become REO properties. All investors used 
multiple listing services (MLS), which consist of available properties collected from many 
investors. Other methods included regularly driving around their neighborhoods, word of mouth, 
and soliciting potential sellers through direct mail and chatting with other investors in online 
forums.  
When deciding on purchasing an REO property, investors typically assess characteristics 
at two levels. One is the property-level characteristics, and the other is the neighborhood-level 
characteristics. Some investors will primarily rely on a single street or block, while others will 
primarily assess a larger geographical area. Most investors indicated that the neighborhood 
characteristics were more important to property-level characteristics. As one investor replied, 
“The feel of the community’s the most important. Then I look at the street. How does it look? 
Does it feel right? Then the last thing I look at is the house.” 
When assessing a neighborhood, investors will consider a variety of areas, including 
housing and social components. Owner-occupancy, vacancy, and blight are among the most 
important for most investors. This is followed by crime (both violent and property), school 




Crime represented the largest reason why investors would decline to purchase an REO 
property in a distressed neighborhood. For investors looking for rental properties to manage, a 
neighborhood with moderate or high crime meant a high rate of tenant turnover, which would 
likely mean repeated maintenance duties required for bringing in new tenants. In addition, vacant 
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units in these neighborhoods were perceived to be targets for theft and vandalism. One 
respondent reported that frequent theft could make a property’s operating costs too high to be 
profitable. 
Most investors reported carefully assessing a neighborhood’s vacant and blighted units 
before purchasing an REO property, especially if they were unfamiliar with the neighborhood or 
did not own properties there. But sometimes, several vacant units on the same street were seen as 
an opportunity. If a block contained several vacant units, one investor reported contacting other 
investors to see if several investors were willing to purchase a property on the same street. That 
both spreads the risk and creates the potential for a notable improvement in neighborhood 
conditions: 
 
If the street is in a good location and the renovation costs for each individual unit is low 
then I might be able to get three or four (other investors) to go in on it. But if I just buy 
one property, (there is) no way that house is going to turn profitable.” 
 
Investors noted that high owner-occupancy rates in a neighborhood were among the most 
important conditions for selecting a unit, along with low vacancy rates. One said, “That is what 
shows pride in the neighborhood. It’s really easy and apparent. Those are the neighborhoods 
where they cut the grass, you don’t have to worry about people letting their homes go to waste.” 
 
Property Disposition 
When it came to investors purchasing properties to sell as opposed to properties to rent, 
there was no geographic pattern discernable from the interview conducted. The large and 
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medium-sized investors interviewed were all engaging in a mix of for-sale and for-rent 
properties. Far fewer small investors were engaged in purchasing REO properties for-rent. All 
investors that did manage rental properties noted that it has become a more prominent part of 
their business in the past five years. While housing prices in the Southland region remain weak, 
some respondents reported that they noticed a uptick in homeowner demand within the past two 
years, although this increase was particularly focused in the higher-income neighborhoods.  
Nearly all investors noted that the tight credit market was impacting their decision to 
purchase properties to sell. Some mentioned that appraisal costs could make a property 
unprofitable. Housing appraisals after more than a decade of housing market upheaval presets a 
range of difficulties. The issue mentioned the most by investors interviewed included a lack of 
comparable properties in the same neighborhood that had sold recently. This was particularly 
prominent in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. One respondent noted that they have 
passed on several properties in moderate-income neighborhood because “I can paint and carpet 
the home and still sell for an affordable price, but because this is one of the hardest-hit ZIP codes 
for foreclosures, I get redlined. The lenders say [to the owner-occupiers], ‘Do I want to go back 
there?’” 
 
Schools and Transportation 
Most investors did not mention schools as an important criterion. One did note that good 
schools are a positive condition, but that even REO properties in neighborhoods with 
substandard schools can sell if the house is purchased and sold at the right price.  
Investors noted that transit in Southland was not as good as in the City of Chicago, and 
most did not consider proximity to transit as important, as it is assumed that all owner-occupants 
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or renters have access to an auto. Many who live in Southland commute to Chicago, so 
properties near a freeway are generally more desirable.  
 
Property-Level Characteristics 
The most important property-level characteristic was house size, with investors claiming 
that large homes were preferable. But while several investors noted that smaller units were not 
worth the potential profit, another preferred smaller units. This investor noted smaller units could 
be profitable because they were generally overlooked by most investors and were available at 
little cost.  
 
Investor Acquisition Methods 
The Investor in the Southland Region typically employed several methods for acquiring 
REO properties. Many reported purchasing REO properties from lenders or servicers during the 
peak years of the foreclosure crisis, although none frequently engaged in that recently.  Some 
investors also purchased properties through short sales, as well as through conventional sales that 
were often bought from other investors.  
Some investors attended Cook County foreclosure auctions for properties, which presents 
foreclosed properties for purchase before they become REO properties. Other investors argued 
that auctioned properties were too risky because they cannot enter the properties prior to 
purchasing. The investors who purchased at auction had been doing so for years, some since the 
early 2000s. These investors were more experienced and had experience in construction and 
rehab. They also claimed to have a lot of knowledge about the neighborhood that a particular 
auction a property was located. One investor reported that while people were not allowed inside 
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the units prior to purchasing, they were still able to conduct an external inspection, and they were 
confident enough in their construction experience to manage any potential risks. Another noted 
that: 
 
Buying at auction gives a lot of options and … there is a lower acquisition price and a 
better margin so that means that whatever problem I encounter … I can assume that the 
worst-case scenario is a break-even (sale). 
 
All investors interviewed—even the larger investors--purchased properties one at a time 
and were not engaged in bulk purchases. Some investors noted that buying properties in bulk was 
too risky. The investors interviewed described a range of acquisition prices and renovation costs. 
For example, a small-scale investor aimed to purchase properties for between $10,000 and 
$20,000, although many others purchase within the $20,000 - $50,000 range. 
When considering renovation, the most important figure is the maximum amount an 
investor is willing to spend on a property. This is determined by the net cash flow that the 
property is expected to generate, the acquisition cost, and the investor’s required cash-on-cash 
return. Investor’s maximum renovation costs varied greatly. These are based on property size or 
properties located in more or less desirable locations. 
 
Managing Rental Units  
 All medium and large investors engaged in buying REOs to rent, although less than half 
of the small investors engaged in rental properties. Many noted that modifying their business for 
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rentals meant taking on several new functions, including attracting tenants, setting rents, 
retaining tenants, and reducing turnover. 
 Rental units’ prices ranged from $750 a month for a 1,000-square-foot house to $1,400 
for a renovated 1,600 square-foot-house. Rents vary greatly across the Southland region, and 
investors noted that rents could also vary greatly from block to block, as a blighted street could 
reduce rents even if it was located in a desirable neighborhood. Investors renting in moderate-
income neighborhoods admitted that some rentals for $700 to $800 a month were undercutting 
the market, but they were employed to reduce the number of vacant units in their portfolio. 
Renting at a below-market rate was preferable to a vacant unit.  
Investors involved in renting were very interested in keeping tenants, as it was important 
to maintaining operating returns. An additional aspect of distressed units is that vacant units are 
more vulnerable to vandalism of theft. Investors priced the cost of losing a tenant and gaining a 
new one at about $1,500, which does not include the rental income lost. 
Investors who rented to Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) users reported lower turnover 
rates. HCV users are common in the Southland region, and investors generally approved of the 
HCV program and their relationship with the Cook County Housing Authority (CCHA), which 
administers the program in the Chicago region. One investor noted that CCHA and the Chicago 
Housing Authority will quickly respond to problems with tenants. For example, CCHA told a 
tenant that they would no longer be eligible for the program if the tenant did not pay their water 
bill. For property-managing investors, the CCHA provides assistance for tenants who may not 
pay their rent or utilities. An investor noted that all HCV users are aware of the long waiting list 




Investors varied in their use of property managers. All medium and large investors used 
them, but nearly all small investors did not. One small investor noted that property managers are 
incentivized to increase tenant turnover, since they are paid with the first month’s rent. This 
results in subpar service for the tenants. The unreliability of property managers was echoed by 
others. As a result, most small investors interviewed engaged in their own property management.  
 
Working with Nonprofit and Public Actors 
All private investors were asked about any working relationships or partnerships with 
nonprofit organizations. Most investors only have little to no interaction, although some 
investors had substantial interaction and relationships. Most medium- and large-sized investors 
were involved with their local chambers of commerce, while one small investor was heavily 
involved. One small investor had experience with local nonprofit investors and developers, 
noting that nonprofits sometimes ask for higher quality products that an investor is typically 
willing to provide, noting that nonprofits “had the goals of a homebuyer,” when it came to home 
rehabilitation. Additionally, this investor noted that these organizations move slower than a 
small, flexible and opportunistic investor, noting that “to survive in this business you have to 
move fast and projects with RFPs and long lead times are going to hurt (my projected profits).” 
The nonprofit interviewees reported extensive experience working with for-profit 
investors, but both stressed the importance of making sure that the investor and nonprofit’s goals 
must be aligned.  
21 
Key Findings and Conclusions 
 
61 
These interviews with REO property investors of varying sizes indicated that in the wake 
of the foreclosure crisis, investors in REO properties have the potential to play a substantial role 
in neighborhood well-being, including the neighborhood recovery process and efforts to insulate 
neighborhoods from excessive upheaval during a future housing market downturn. This is 
particularly true in the Southland region, which had some of the highest levels of REO properties 
and REO investor activity in the Chicago MSA. The interviewees revealed six important findings 
about investor strategies, expectations, and behavior in areas that experienced a concentration of 
REO properties.  
First, investors consider neighborhood characteristics substantially more important than 
property characteristics. Important neighborhood-level topics include crime, vacancy, and blight. 
This indicates that investors may be willing to make extra expenses with regard to renovation 
and other property investments if a neighborhood is viewed as stable or improving. 
Understanding neighborhood qualities that investors prioritize can help local governments 
connect investors to certain distressed or “problem” properties. There is currently little evidence 
that the sale of REO properties are contributing to gentrification, and none of the respondents 
indicated that the neighborhoods in the Southland were showing signs of gentrification. While 
this study does not track signifiers of gentrification such as median income increases, home 
value or rent increases, Gilderbloom et al. (2012) found fewer foreclosed properties in 
gentrifying neighborhoods, although Molina (2016) did find evidence or REO properties 
purchased by both owner-occupiers and investors were concentrated with in gentrifying suburbs 
in the Los Angeles region. The contribution that investors make to gentrification processes is 
difficult to determine, but investor activity does highlight the tensions of policies that support 
investors who rehabilitate properties with the goal of maintaining stable, affordable housing.  
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Second, investors may be willing to work with nonprofit and governmental agencies and 
programs, but these opportunities are almost always perceived to entail higher costs, whether 
they are higher renovation standards or in temporal terms, such as having to accept a slow 
moving bureaucratic process. Further examination of what types of costs private investors are 
willing to accept and what benefits they are most attracted to can help planners and local 
governments develop programs that can encourage investor activity and investment in desired 
neighborhoods.  
Third, the tight credit market has negatively impacted demand for owner-occupied 
properties, particularly in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. A neighborhood 
experiencing a decrease in homeowners is generally not seen as a good place to invest in single-
family properties. If planners and policymakers are interested in encouraging investors to 
purchase, renovate, and maintain properties in a neighborhood with declining homeownership 
rates, they will have to understand neighborhood characteristics, such as homeownership trends, 
that will dampen investor enthusiasm for purchasing single family properties.   
Fourth, investors who manage rental properties are willing to accept HCV recipients, as 
they see the CHA as a reliable ally in managing tenants. The HCV program is currently the 
largest affordable housing assistance program in the United States, although discrimination 
against HCV holders by landlords is a pressing issue that produces severe limitations for low- 
and moderate-income HCV recipients (Tamica, 2009). While evidence of discrimination against 
HCV holders is prevalent nationally and in the Chicago region (Chicago Lawyers' Committee for 
Civil Rights, 2014), investors who manage rental properties interviewed saw favorable aspects of 
renting to tenants in the program, such as a lower tenant turnover and the CHA’s willingness to 
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respond to problem tenants or other issues. These reported experiences could be used to argue for 
expand or at least maintaining the HCV program.  
While these findings represent areas where investors largely agreed upon, more research 
on investor activity is needed to better understand the often-complex business models. In 
particular, research is needed that explores the single-family rental sector, as the investors 
interviewed in this chapter do not think it will decline any time soon. In addition, it is important 
to understand the limitations of this study. The region, Southland Chicago, was purposefully 
selected due to its status as an area with particularly high REO property concentration and a 
particularly high concentration of investor purchases. Nevertheless, many regions in the United 
States have experienced a similar pattern, and it is important to better understand how real estate 
investors respond to the recent housing market crisis and recovery. Finally, it is important to note 
that this interview sample may affect the findings. As noted in the methodology chapter, several 
interviewers were contacted after consulting members of local governments and nonprofit 
groups. The investors who have working relationships with public or nonprofit groups may not 
be representative of investors in Southland or the Chicago area as a whole. It is possible that they 
have better relationships with local governments and are more approving of local housing 
policies and planning interventions that other investors. This study concludes that investors are 
willing to work with local governments and that most investors only displayed mild criticism of 
policies or programs they found inadequate or detrimental. But it is possible that other investors 
have a more adversarial relationship with local governments. In addition, these relationships may 
also mean that investors were not willing offer more negative characterization of the 
communities that they were active in as well. Very little is known about how local governments 
and local planners can build relationships with real estate investors in a manner that creates 
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mutual benefits. Future studies that examine investor’s feelings towards local governments and 
local policies could reveal more effective ways that planners and policymakers could engage 
with a larger number of real estate investors.    
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CHAPTER 5: WHERE DO REOs SELL? WHERE DO THEY LINGER? EXAMINING 
CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH TIME TO SALE 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the hypothesis that neighborhood characteristics such as suburb 
type or minority population will influence the time an REO property spends on the market. 
Identifying characteristics related to the time a property spends in REO status is important for an 
analysis of neighborhood recovery. Previous studies have found that the time a property spends 
on the market is crucial when assessing if the house will eventually sell. Apgar and Duda (2005) 
found that the common neighborhood-level negative externalities of foreclosures increase 
exponentially with the amount of time an REO spends on the market. The stigma of a foreclosed 
unit will decrease the value of nearby properties, while for local governments REO properties 
often mean police and fire suppression, building inspections, and legal fees. In addition, vacant 
REO properties that are on the market longer are more likely to develop structural problems such 
as frozen pipes, or water and mold damage. This study finds that REO properties in 
neighborhoods with higher proportions of minority and older residents take longer to sell, which 
is consistent with previous studies (Coulton, Schramm, & Hirsh, 2008; Pfeiffer & Molina, 2013; 
Smith & Duda, 2009). However, this study finds that properties in the City of Chicago typically 
take longer to sell than properties in suburban areas, which stands in contrast to patterns found in 






The data set on REO sales shows that the mean REO property in the Chicago MSA took 
about 17 months to sell. This is longer period of time than other studies of REO sales, but 
possibly indicates Chicago’s weaker housing market compared with studies by Mallach (2010) 
and Pfeiffer and Molina (2013) that examined markets in Las Vegas and Southern California, 
respectively. About 36% of all REO properties were sold by GSE lenders.  
On average, REO sales were in neighborhoods that were 23% African American and 22% 
Hispanic. These are comparable with the regional averages of 21% and 20% for African 
Americans and Hispanics. The average REO sale was in a census block group with 11% of the 
population over 65, which is comparable with the regional block group average of 12%. The 
median HDI value was 0.63, which indicates that the REO property sales were in block groups 
with a less diverse housing stock than the regional mean HDI, which is 0.55. This could indicate 
that housing stock diversity plays a role in neighborhood stability and that neighborhoods with 



















Figure 5.2: Single-Family REO Events Normalized by Total Single-Family Homes in 





Figure 5.3: Single-Family REO Events Normalized by Total Single-Family Homes in 





Outer-ring block groups—which are heavily populated by single-family units—had the 
most overall REO transactions, at about 37%, followed by inner-ring block groups at 29%. Block 
groups in the City of Chicago accounted for just 17% of all transactions, and only 9% in exurban 
municipalities. The block group foreclosure event rate for REO property sales was about 12 per 
100 houses. As expected, this is higher than the regional average of about seven per 100 houses. 
Finally, the descriptive statistics show similarities in the distribution of location affordability 
measures between median- and moderate-income families. The standard deviations of housing 
costs by neighborhood for median- and moderate-income families are 2.86% and 3.65%, 
respectively (see Table 5.1). In contrast, the standard deviation for a single-parent family is 
8.41% indicating that the amount a single-parent family is calculated to pay for housing and 
transportation varies more across the region. Figures 5.4 to 5.6 shows the geographic distribution 
of REO sales to investors, normalized by the total number of single-family houses. There is a 
clear concentration in Chicago’s South Side and in northwest Indiana. This contrasts with recent 
studies of investor activity in Las Vegas, where investors were more evenly distributed 
geographically and among socioeconomically different neighborhoods (Mallach, 2014). Mallach 
notes that Las Vegas had a strong investor support network in place prior to the crisis. This may 
explain why relatively hotter markets like Las Vegas and Southern California experienced 
investor activity more broadly across different geographic areas. The investor networks in the 
Chicago region are further explored in Chapter 6.  
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of REO Purchases by Investors, 2009-2013 in Chicago’s 





Figure 5.6: Distribution of REO Purchases by Investors, 2009-2013 in Chicago’s 





There are several mechanisms that could explain the investor preference for these areas in 
the Chicago region. First, the properties in these areas could simply be those with the largest gap 
between what investors value in a property and what owner-occupier households value. This 
could include differences in property condition and estimated improvement or upkeep costs, or 
estimated appreciation over time. Furthermore, it could be that households are simply more 
willing to outbid investors in outer-ring and exurban neighborhoods. A second explanation may 
be that since most investors keep a relatively light inventory of properties most of the time, they 
are simply focusing on specific geographic areas within the region. This may be because 
property maintenance is easier when investors own properties within a bounded geographic 
range or investors may only purchase properties in neighborhoods that they are familiar with. 
Finally, the concentration of investor activity in these areas could be a product easier access to 
equity in contrast to what is available to homeowners interested in purchasing single-family 
properties in these neighborhoods. New lending restrictions may make it difficult for moderate-
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Determinants of the Time an REO Property Spends on the Market 
The REO property sales sample size of REO for this model was roughly 48,000, a large 
number. Very large datasets can cause issues in regression analysis, such as turning insignificant 
coefficients significant or skewed goodness of fit tests. To address this issue, two models were 
employed, one using the entire sample, and another that consisted of a random sample of 10,000 
REO sales. The results from both models were largely similar, although there were a few notable 
Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
Months to Sale 17.07 20.46 11.63 0 60
Sale at Auction 4.32% NA NA NA NA
Sale to Investor 29.37% NA NA NA NA
GSE Seller 35.36% NA NA NA NA
Neighborhood characteristics
2010 % African American 23.10% 22.49% 33.98% 0.00% 100.00%
2010 % Hispanic 22.36% 12.96% 24.31% 0.00% 100.00%
2010 % Over 65 11.06% 15.42% 6.37% 0.32% 80.29%
2010 % Percent Households in Poverty 10.64% 7.03% 10.73% 0.00% 83.43%
2010 % Homowners w/ Mortgage 83.37% 84.46% 8.72% 0.00% 100.00%
2010 % Renters 23.51% 17.94% 20.36% 0.00% 100.00%
Housing Diversity Index 0.63 0.62 0.25 0.14 1
2005-2009 Foreclosures/100 units (log) 12.42 12.05 2.07 0.09 60.76
Employment Access Index 2923.39 2269.41 2218.132 220 63410
Median Income Family Housing Costs 31.33% 38.45% 2.86% 10.75% 63.55%
Median Income Family Transportation Costs 22.05% 28.25% 1.94% 12.27% 26.88%
Single Parent Family Housing Costs 52.19% 48.13% 8.41% 21.51% 127.10%
Single Parent Fmaily Transportaiton Costs 31.42% 30.84% 3.42% 14.33% 39.50%
Moderate Income Family Housing Costs 38.55% 42.21% 3.65% 13.44% 79.44%
Moderate Income Family Transportation Costs 21.21% 25.26% 2.23% 9.91% 26.66%
REO Sales in City of Chicago 17.42% NA NA NA NA
REO Sales in inner ring municipalities 29.77% NA NA NA NA
REO Sales in outer ring municipalities 37.21% NA NA NA NA
REO Sales in exurban municipalities 9.94% NA NA NA NA
REO Sales in unincorporated areas 5.66% NA NA NA NA





differences. In the 10,000 sample model, some variables that were significant in the model with 
48,000 observations were not significant. The HDI and Foreclosure Rate variables were not 
significant. In addition, the Exurban Neighborhood variable was significant in the 10,000 sale 
sample but not in the 48,000 sale sample. Because a smaller sample of 10,000 is generally 
regarded as less sensitive than the 48,000 sample, this is the model that will be used in the results 
and analysis for this chapter, while the results of the 48,000 sample model can be found in 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The model results can be viewed in Table 5.2. Overall, the results show that REO 
properties in neighborhoods with higher proportions of minority and older residents take longer 
to sell. This is expected, as these areas likely experienced less demand prior to the housing 
market downturn. This study also found that between 2009 and 2013, 4.6% of all foreclosed 
properties were sold to investors or households at a foreclosure auction, whereas the rest became 
REO properties. Smith and Duda (2009) found that only 1.7% of foreclosed properties were sold 
at an auction in the City of Chicago in 2008. This higher rate from 2009 to 2013 could indicate 
an increased interest in sales at foreclosure auctions, or it could indicate that properties in 
Chicago’s suburbs are more likely to sell at auction. As Figure 5.7 shows, the probability of sale 
increased steadily until the 17th month on the market, which was when properties had the 
greatest chance of selling. After that, a property’s chance of sale gradually decreased. As 
expected, homes sold at auction (specified as month 0) are far more likely to be sold to investors 
than to households. In addition, Figure 5.7 shows that REO properties are far more likely to be 
sold to investors in the first few months they are on the market than to homebuyers. It is not until 
a property has been in REO status for about a year that it becomes more likely to be sold to a 
household. This is supported by findings in the previous chapter that investors exchanged 
information in online forums, which appears to give them an information advantage when it 
comes to identifying REO properties new to the market. This finding also shows the apparent 
efficacy of investor support networks allow them an advantage over owner-occupant 
homebuyers (Herbert, Lew, & Sanchez-Moyano, 2013, Immergluck & Law, 2014). These results 
indicate that planners concerned with neighborhood recovery should pay particular attention to 
properties that have been on the market for longer than 18 months, because these are the 
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properties that are more likely to be problematic long-term vacancies. The results in Table 5.2 
show that the most substantial neighborhood-level variable that influences an REO’s propensity 
to sell is the HDI. This means that single-family units in neighborhoods with more diverse 
housing unit choices can be expected to sell faster than single-family units in neighborhoods with 
a relatively homogenous housing stock, although there are likely home price differences that this 
study was unable to control for. Considering what is known about urban development patterns, it 
is likely that neighborhoods that are more homogenous with regard to single family unit 
population are also more economically and socially exclusive. Exploring REO sales or just 
typical home sales between neighborhoods with different levels of housing diversity while 
controlling for home price could lead to important findings related to how neighborhood-level 
housing diversity relates to a single-family property’s desirability.  
The most influential negative neighborhood variable is the foreclosure event rate from 
2005 to 2009. This is not surprising, because these neighborhoods are likely to have the greater 
supply of vacant REO units. Similarly, single-family REO properties may be more prone to sell 
in neighborhoods with greater housing diversity because of a lower supply of these types of 
units. Employment access and median housing costs had strong negative relationships with the 
time to sell. The Employment Access Index (EAI) measures the number of nearby jobs, 
indicating that single-family REO properties closer to employment hubs take longer to sell. 
Furthermore, as the median calculated housing costs for a neighborhood rise, the time to sale is 
likely to increase. The results of Table 5.2 also show that REO properties in neighborhoods with 
high percentages of older residents will take longer to sell. This may be because neighborhoods 
with high percentages of older residents have historically experienced less residential turnover. 
In other words, communities with older residents may be among the least desirable for those 
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seeking either to invest in a home or to purchase it as an owner-occupier. Recent studies have 
noted that inner-ring suburbs that are characterized by an older, homogenous housing stock have 
struggled with an aging population, as well as population loss and disinvestment (Hanlon, 2009; 
Lee & Leigh, 2007; Vicino, 2008). Vacant REO properties in these neighborhoods may prove 


























The disproportionate impact of the foreclosure crisis on disadvantaged communities 
continues to be seen in recovery outcomes. In general, high-poverty neighborhoods and 
communities of color have experienced greater negative spillover effects of concentrated 
foreclosures. This study examined the temporal processes of REO dispositions in the Chicago 
MSA, a region that shares a lot in common with other hard-hit cities like Detroit and Cleveland, 
but also boasts a more diverse housing market. As new foreclosure filings subside and the 
housing market enters a prolonged recovery, this study shows that neighborhoods with high 
proportions of minority and older populations are likely to face a slower recovery, with 
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properties there taking much longer to sell. Central cities and inner-ring suburbs, where such 
populations reside in greater proportions, are particularly vulnerable to such outcomes. These 
neighborhoods are also more likely to attract speculative investors and less likely to attract 
owner-occupying households.  
These findings are similar to Smith and Duda (2009) and Pfeiffer and Molina (2013), 
which found that REO properties in African American neighborhoods took longer to sell. When 
examining 19 cities consisting of the top 5% regarding the number of REO properties that were 
on the market for two years or longer (normalized by the total number of single-family housing 
units), all were either in the Southland region or the southwest suburbs. Of those, 14 of the 19 
cities are in the Southland area. These include the inner-ring suburbs that border Chicago such as 
Dolton, Riverdale, and Calumet city. These are cities with an older housing stock with median 
home prices ranging from $118,000 to $135,000. But also among the top cities with REO 
properties that remained vacant for over two years are Matteson and Monee Village, outer ring 
suburbs with relatively newer housing stock and median home values that range from $155,000 
to $198,000. This, combined with the model results indicating that an REO property located 
within an inner-ring and outer-ring suburb are less likely to sell every month than an REO 
property located within the City of Chicago indicates that as the housing market recovers, 
smaller suburban cities may face the most challenges for reducing the number of vacant REO 
units. This significant differences in REO disposition between Chicago and its nearby suburbs 
identifies a need for future studies that examine if place-based policies and programs that were 
intended to alleviate the negative effects of the foreclosure crisis had different effects between 
central cities and suburbs.  
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While the previous chapter found that investors were active in the Southland region and 
that they were interested in purchasing REO units, the findings of this chapter suggests that these 
investors are taking advantage of the high rate of REO properties, but they are either very 
discriminating in the units they purchase or there are simply too many REO properties in areas 
like Southland and not enough willing investors. In the previous chapter, several investors did 
display a willingness to become property managers or expand into property management. 
Policies that encourage converting single-family properties to rentals could benefit many in the 
Southland region, particularly the residents who lost their home through foreclosure and may not 
have the savings or an adequate credit score for a mortgage. Additionally, new restrictions on 
lending mean that the ability of moderate-income households to purchase single-family homes in 
neighborhoods that offer the greatest location affordability is severely restrained.  
To conclude, this analysis raises several questions that are addressed in the next chapter. 
This chapter and the previous chapter provide evidence that investors get first pick of the 
available REO properties over owner-occupant buyers. But this chapter also finds that there are 
still far more REO properties on the market than interested buyers. The next chapter focuses on 
REO property sales and identifies different patterns between investor purchases and owner-
occupant purchases, as well as the neighborhood-level characteristics associated with REOs 
purchased by each group. When combined with results from this chapter and the previous 
chapter, the final analysis chapter will allow for a robust analysis of investor purchasing 
preferences, spatial patterns or investor purchasing, and identify the areas where recovery, as 






CHAPTER 6: WHERE DO REOs CLUSTER? WHERE ARE INVESTORS 




The previous chapter analyzed the length of time that an REO property takes to sell and 
found that neighborhoods with high minority populations and older populations are likely to 
remain on the housing market longer, while indicating that investors get first choice of new 
REOs that enter the market. These findings may help planners and policymakers understand the 
types of communities that are likely to struggle with recovery after a housing market downturn 
and which ones are likely to become the focus of speculation by real estate professionals. 
Generally, we know that the neighborhood characteristics such as racial composition, median 
age, and poverty rate can show clustering patterns (Mikelbank, 2008, Ellen, et al., 2011, Gupta, 
2016). This chapter examines the geographic distribution of two key variables considered in this 
study—REO events and investor purchases.  
Examining the spatial pattern exhibited by these two variables is important because when 
jointly considered they may identify strong relationships with important neighborhood 
characteristics. REO properties can then be sold to a household that seeks to live in the unit, or to 
an investor who seeks to gain a profit from a future sale of the unit or by employing the unit as a 
rental property. Because timely reoccupation of REO units is a key aspect of neighborhood 




Although there may be an overlap between the types of single-family properties that draw 
interest from both investors and households, there are also likely neighborhood and property 
characteristics that specifically appeal to either group. This is because investors and households 
have fundamentally different goals from owner-occupants when purchasing a property. Investors 
seek to gain a profit through renting or future sale of the property, whereas households seek a 
place to live. Owner-occupant households will seek properties that appreciate in value, but it is 
usually with an eye towards long-term gains. In addition, many investors have the specialized 
knowledge for dealing with the many problems associated with REO homes, such as property 
damage and toxic or complicated titles. Consequently, the purchasing preferences for each group 
could be different with regard to different neighborhood characteristics. 
The primary research questions of this chapter are (1) Do real estate investor purchasing 
patterns differ from general patterns of REO clustering and are any neighborhood-level 
characteristics associated with this concentrated investor activity?, and (2) Do owner-occupant 
households that seek to live in a unit and investors consistently choose different  REO single-
family properties, and (3) If so are these differences attributable to characteristics of the housing 
unit or the neighborhood? This chapter uses a comprehensive data set of foreclosures between 
2005 and 2009 and sales between 2009 and 2013, and devises an approach to separate REO 
properties sold to investors from those purchased by owner-occupant buyers.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
In all, 29% of REO transactions from 2009 to 2014 were sold to investors. Although all 
property sales records identify the purchasing party, determining the precise number of 
properties owned by each investor remains difficult because a single investor may own and 
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control several different real estate limited liability corporations (LLCs). Furthermore, buyer 
names on transaction records may be inconsistent. Nevertheless, using this repeatedly validated 
classification approach, this study finds that in the Chicago area, a majority of REO investors are 
relatively small scale. This is consistent with research in other regions (Mallach, 2014), and 
similar to that found in Ford et al.’s (2013) study of investor activity in Cleveland, and 
Immergluck’s (2010) study of Atlanta. Recent studies have noted that large-scale investors have 
become a greater part of the REO market since 2013 (Effinger, 2014; Herbert et al., 2013). But 
from 2009 to 2014, only 7% of all REO purchases in the Chicago region were made by investors 
who bought 10 or more properties within that time period, and only eight investors purchased 
more than 100 properties within that time period. In addition, 87% of all REO properties were 
sold to investors who purchased three or fewer properties during that time period. A difference-
in-means test of the variables indicates that properties bought by investors were more likely to be 
on the market for a shorter period of time. This might indicate an investor advantage over 
homeowners with regard to information on the market and properties available, and it might 
indicate that investors are purchasing the most desirable properties. But it is not known how 
investors identify new properties or what characteristics they look for when deciding on 
purchasing an REO property.  
 
Results: Hotspot Analysis 
The hot spot analysis sought to examine spatial patterns related to two variables, both 
using the block group as the unit of analysis. First, the clustering of REO properties within block 
groups in the Chicago MSA. Using GIS, all REO events were geocoded and joined to the block 
group. The number of single-family REO events were normalized by the total number of single-
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family units in the block group. Second, the clustering or REO properties purchased by investors 
in the Chicago MSA was examined. Similarly, REO properties purchased by investors were 
geocoded and joined to their block group. The number of REO properties purchased by investors 
was normalized by the total number of REO events within the block group.  
As Figure 6.1 shows, the hotspot analysis identified clear areas of concentration for both 
REO properties and investor purchases. This clustering of investor activity in predominantly 
African American neighborhoods is similar to recent studies that examined investor purchasing 
patterns in Boston, Atlanta, and Cleveland, where investor activity was concentrated in low-
income and predominantly African American neighborhoods, although it differs from investor 
activity in Las Vegas, which was dispersed across a range of different neighborhoods of different 
socioeconomic character (Herbert et al., 2013). It is likely that investors may see these properties 
as offering potentially greater rates of return, but the underlying reasons are still largely 
unknown. One possibility is that the wealth of affordable REO properties in these neighborhoods 
simply present the most viable choice of affordable property investments to purchase properties 
without extensive financing or a lot of equity (Herbert et al., 2013). But the relationship between 








Figures 6.2-6.6 show the hot spot analysis of block groups with a larger percentage of REO 
property transfers went to investors for each year from 2009 to 2013. Here, investor purchases 
are normalized by the overall number of REO sales. The figures show large clusters of investor 
interest that remain constant from 2009 to 2013 in Chicago’s south side, as well in Southland and 
the nearby southwest suburbs, Lake County Indiana, as well as smaller clusters in Lawndale, 
Garfield Park, and Austin neighborhoods on the West Side of Chicago, and in Lincoln Square 
and North Center in Chicago’s North Side. While the Western suburbs were a hot spot for 
investors in the early years of the housing market recovery, investor activity eventually faded. In 
contrast, investor clustering in Southland remained strong and significant from 2009 to 2013. 
Also notable is a gradually increasing hot spot in Lake County, which indicates growing investor 
activity in the relatively wealthy areas north of Chicago. In addition, Figures 6.2 to 6.5 identify 
the overlapping clusters for all three hot spot analyses. Here, two small clusters in Lake County, 
three in Cook County, and one in Lake County in Indiana all show significant clustering of REO 
events and investor interest. Several large clusters also in the outer ring suburbs of the Chicago 






































Figures 6.7 through 6.9 show investor purchasing hot spots in the Chicago region, 
divided into three separate figures for easier viewing. In 6.6, we see that investors are 
concentrated in the city of Gary, Indiana and the small, urban corridor of Northwest Indiana 
closest to Chicago. Of the investors interviewed from Chapter 4, none of the eleven small-scale 
investors were active in Indiana, nor were the two medium-scale investors. But both large-scale 
investors remarked that they considered Northwest Indiana within their area and had purchased 
properties there. This study is not able to determine whether the investors active in Indiana are 
similar in their strategies and actions as those active in the Southland region, but these results 
could indicate that state lines represent a type of boundary for investors, although whether that 
boundary is related to issues such as knowledge of local and state laws or not is still unknown. 
Figure 6.7 shows the South Side of Chicago, as well as the Southland region and the 
Southwestern suburbs. Here, there is a clear concentration of investors in the South Side and 
Southland. The hot spots are exclusively east of Interstate 57, which many consider as an 
unofficial border between the largely-African American Southland region and the majority white 
southwest suburbs. This figure shows that investor activity followed that same delineation. 
Finally, Figure 6.9 shows Chicago’s North Side and northern suburbs. Again we see significant 
investor concertation in a largely African American neighborhood in Austin and some surround 
areas within the City of Chicago. The other major hot spot is in the middle-class and majority-
Hispanic city of Waukegan in Lake County north of Chicago. These results confirm that 
investors are heavily concentrated in mostly working class and majority-minority neighborhoods 
throughout the Chicago region. When these figures are compared with figure 6.1, which 
identifies the hot spots for REO properties, there is a notable absence of investor concentration in 
the outer-ring and exurban communities that displayed significant signs of REO clustering. 
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Many recent studies have identified urban core and inner-ring neighborhoods as well as exurban 
neighborhoods as experiencing high rates of foreclosures since the mid-2000s (Coulton, et al., 
2008; Lucy, 2010, Anacker, Carr, and Pradhan, 2012), although investor purchasing patterns for 
REO properties with regard to these neighborhood types has been largely unexamined. This 
study finds that investors in Chicago are far more likely to seek out and purchase properties in 
the urban core and inner-ring neighborhoods with very little interest in exurban neighborhoods, 
despite a large number of REO properties available. Future studies should seek to better 
understand this discrepancy, possibly by asking real estate investors why they focus on the 
neighborhoods they do as well as examine if this pattern observed in the Chicago region applies 
to other large metropolitan areas in the United States.  
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Figure 6.8: Investor Purchase Rate Hot Spot Analysis in South Chicago, Southern Suburbs, 











Overall, these results show that investors are drawn to purchasing property in the central 
city, in inner-ring suburbs and in neighborhoods with high minority populations. This is similar 
to what was found in Pfeiffer and Molina’s (2013) study of Southern California. Although the 
percentage of the population in poverty variable was insignificant for the final model, it does 
become significant when the African American population is dropped from the model, with 
similar coefficient results for the remaining variables. Further testing found collinearity between 
the two variables. Previous studies have found that REO property sales to investors also tend to 
be in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. As Mallach (2010) notes, REO property holders 
are interested in selling low-value properties as quickly as possible. This is most apparent in 
weak-market areas. This is consistent with REO dispositions in Boston and New York (Herbert 
et al., 2013; Ellen et al., 2014), although investor patterns in metropolitan areas such as Southern 
California and Miami–Dade County found less concentration in the urban core (Pfeiffer & 
Molina, 2013; Ellen et al., 2014).  
Figures 6.10 to 6.14 show hot spots for investor purchases for each year from 2009 to 
2013. As expected, there is a consistent cold spot in Chicago’s North Side, where single-family 
properties are rare, as well as a constant hot spot all years in Chicago’s South Side. Also notable 
is the growth in investor concentration in the Southland region from 2009 to 2010, indicating that 
investors entered the market in 2010. Also notable is that hot spots appear in Chicago’s outer-
ring and exurban regions, but they appear to be short-lived, in that there is little consistency from 
year to year. This is likely due to the fact that there are fewer properties in these areas, but it 
could also be indicative of the fact that these neighborhoods recover relatively quickly and that 
























This analysis comes with some caveats. First, it is important to note that not all investors 
have the same goals when purchasing an REO property. Some are interested in flipping the 
property as soon as possible, whereas others may purchase a property with the intention of 
holding it over an extended period with the expectation that the value will appreciate. In 
addition, some investors will perform necessary repairs, whereas others may not. Finally, many 
investors are interested in transforming previously owner-occupied single-family units into rental 
units (Effinger, 2014). This study was unable to tease out investor intentions, but these intentions 
will be important to understand when evaluating the impact of investors on neighborhood 
recovery.  
 
REO Sales to Investors 
 
Investor activity within the Chicago MSA from 2009 to 2013 was concentrated in the 
City of Chicago and its inner ring suburbs. Investors were most likely to purchase an REO 
property in Chicago, and slightly less likely to purchase in the inner ring suburban 
municipalities. REO properties in outer ring, exurban, and unincorporated municipalities had 
23%, 38%, and 19% less likely to sell to an investor between 2009 and 2013. Reid (2010) finds 
that REO inventory in newer municipalities in Western metropolitan regions are selling faster 
than in older urban cores municipalities, although this does not appear to be the case in the 
Chicago MSA. Not surprisingly, REO properties are more likely to sell to investors after 
spending a shorter amount of time on the market. This could be due to certain advantages 
investors have over owner-occupant households. Investors who are closely tracking the local 
market may be able to learn about new REO properties faster than the typical households. In 












The results of the model also show that a neighborhoods’ housing and transportation 
affordability have a substantial impact on the probability of sale to an investor. In short, investors 
are somewhat more likely to purchase REO properties in neighborhoods that offer more housing 
affordability but not transportation affordability. This is an interesting result in light of the other 
coefficients. First, the results show that investors are about three times more likely than 
households to purchase a property in an African American neighborhood, and about 2 times 
more likely than households to purchase an REO property in a neighborhood with high 
percentages of senior citizens. Similarly, investors are less likely than households to purchase 









GSE/governent seller -0.316 *** 0.023 -0.151 -0.315 *** 0.023 -0.151 -0.316 *** 0.023 -0.151
Months to Sale -0.021 *** 0.001 -0.249 -0.021 *** 0.001 -0.249 -0.021 *** 0.001 -0.248
Neighborhood characteristics
Percent African American 1.156 *** 0.064 0.3846 1.148 *** 0.064 0.381 1.153 *** 0.064 0.385
Percent Hispanic 0.264 *** 0.079 0.0611 0.261 *** 0.080 0.060 0.260 *** 0.079 0.047
Percent over 65 0.701 *** 0.222 0.0468 0.682 *** 0.222 0.043 0.695 *** 0.222 0.048
Percent Households in Poverty 0.089 0.162 0.0439 0.106 0.161 0.006 0.093 0.162 0.003
Percent renter-occupied 0.389 *** 0.110 0.0768 0.387 *** 0.110 0.076 0.385 *** 0.110 0.067
Housing Diversity Index 0.521 *** 0.081 0.134 0.553 *** 0.080 0.142 0.523 *** 0.080 0.131
Foreclosure Rate 2005-2009 0.115 *** 0.025 0.0874 0.118 *** 0.025 0.090 0.116 *** 0.025 0.081
     (log)
Employment Access Index -0.093 *** 0.012 -0.207 -0.101 *** 0.012 -0.224 -0.096 *** 0.012 -0.204
Inner ring suburb -0.096 ** 0.042 -0.028 -0.093 ** 0.042 -0.027 -0.089 ** 0.042 -0.027
Outer ring suburb -0.254 *** 0.052 -0.102 -0.263 *** 0.052 -0.102 -0.249 *** 0.052 -0.104
Exurban suburb -0.447 *** 0.075 -0.151 -0.448 *** 0.075 -0.151 -0.439 *** 0.075 -0.159
Unincorporated area -0.214 *** 0.074 -0.081 -0.218 *** 0.074 -0.083 -0.208 *** 0.075 -0.086
Housing costs -1.793 *** 0.515 -0.049 -0.470 *** 0.174 -0.038 -1.329 *** 0.404 -0.053
     (% of HH budget)
Transportation costs -10.763 *** 1.530 -0.212 -6.536 *** 0.927 -0.226 -9.753 *** 1.372 -0.212
     (% of HH budget)
Constant 1.789 *** 0.373 1.154 *** 0.314 1.439 *** 0.333
Variable
Model 3: Moderate Income 
Family
Model 2: Single Parent 
Family




properties in neighborhoods with high housing and transportation costs relative to household 
income. In other words, the results of this model indicate that investors are active in 
neighborhoods with older and African American populations that are also currently the most 
affordable. The model that replaced a family making a regional median income with a family 
making a moderate income (80% of the median income) produced similar results. When a single-
parent family making 50% of the area median income is used, the influence of housing and 
transportation costs on the probability of sale to an investor is somewhat less substantial. This 
could be due to the wider variance of housing affordability options for single-parent families. As 
such, a single percentage change is less likely to result in a change in investor preferences than a 
single percentage change for moderate or median-income families. The difference in 
transportation coefficients between a two-parent family and a single-parent family is likely 
attributable to the fact that the calculation for a two-parent family assumes two commuters in the 
household.  
REO properties in neighborhoods with higher foreclosure rates were also more likely to 
sell to investors, with investors more likely to purchase properties in neighborhoods with a 
higher rate of renters and lower levels of housing diversity. Furthermore, REO properties sold by 
GSEs are far less likely to sell to investors than REO properties owned by other real estate 
institutions. This may be indicative of different selling goals of GSEs.  For example, Fannie Mae 
has worked closely with Neighborhood Stabilization Program areas and sold properties to public 
entities. In 2009, Fannie Mae also instituted the First Look Initiative, which allows owner-
occupiers or nonprofits the first opportunity to bid on a property.  
This analysis must come with a caveat. Investors-turned-landlords may divide single-
family homes into smaller units, and not invest in maintenance. This means an influx of less 
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affluent tenants will move in and eventually come to dominate the neighborhood. This results in 
declining land values and further neighborhood decline (Baxter and Lauria, 2000). But the 
influence of homeowners is not so grounded (Mallach, 2014)  
The results of this chapter show that real estate investors are very active in central city 
and inner-ring suburban areas and that investor activity in exurban and outer-ring suburbs is 
relatively low, even though the Chicago’s exurban areas experienced high rates of foreclosures 
and REOs. Furthermore, REO property sales to investors also tend to be in poorer African 
American neighborhoods of these areas. As Mallach (2010) notes, sellers of REO properties are 
interested in selling low-value properties as quickly as possible. This is most apparent in weak-
market areas. This is consistent with REO dispositions in Boston and New York (Herbert et al. 
2013b, Ellen, Madar, & Weselcouch, 2014), although investor patterns in metropolitan areas 
such as Southern California and Miami-Dade County found less concentration in the urban core 




As transportation access becomes more important within the context of affordability, it 
will be important for planners and policymakers to understand who is purchasing REO properties 
in the neighborhoods that could be the most affordable for low-income households. Although it 
would be wrong to label all those who invest in property as somehow detrimental to 
neighborhood recovery, it will be important to understand how high levels of investor activity 




Neighborhoods that attract investors engaging in predatory flipping or milking (Mallach, 
2014) will have a far more difficult path to recovery than will neighborhoods that attract 
investors who are interested making a profit by adding equity to properties. Planners and 
policymakers must understand how local conditions can influence investor behavior, and how 
investor behavior can contribute to or impede homeownership rates. A greater number of 
homeowners are associated with greater neighborhood stability (Rohe & Stewart, 1996), higher 
levels of property maintenance (Galster, 1987; Ioannides, 2002), and less crime (Lauridsen, 
Nannerup, & Skak, 2006; Kirk & Laub, 2010). In most housing markets, homeowners drive 
neighborhood housing markets, whereas renters tend to seek shorter term tenure options and will 
often place economy over neighborhood-quality characteristics that are important to homeowners 
(Mallach, 2009). At the same time, REO units may offer opportunities for households may 
otherwise not afford a home. If investors are purchasing these properties and turning them into 
rentals, they could provide adequate affordable rental units for families that would like to live in 
a single-family home but are not able to because of an inability to secure a mortgage. Because 
most investors in this study appear to be relatively small-scale operations, it will be important to 
further examine the purchasing patterns of these investors, as well as their short- and long-term 
intentions. If smaller investors prefer to cluster their REO property purchases, because of either 
cost savings or familiarity with a particular neighborhood, this could be helpful to local 
policymakers, community groups, and planners who are concerned with neighborhood housing 
recovery, as it could indicate potential partnerships that benefit both investors and the greater 
neighborhood. In addition, understanding the motivation of households that purchase REO 
properties will also be important for housing recovery within neighborhoods hard hit by 
foreclosures. REO properties are associated with a host of problems, such as structural damage 
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from lack of upkeep. As such, it is likely that those who purchase REO properties to live in them 
may differ along certain characteristics compared with the greater home buying population at 
large. These results offer important implications for individual mortgage and foreclosure 
transactions as well as for different stakeholders in the recovery and planning processes. 
Whereas the findings of this study confirm those of other studies in that investors in the Chicago 
region were mostly small scale, recent reports and studies have noted that there has been an 
increased interest from mega-investors since 2013 (Effinger, 2014). It will be important to 
examine how the entry of these large investors may change the dynamics of REO purchasing 




CHAPTER 7: CAN INVESTORS HELP RESTORE NEIGHBORHOOD STABILITY? 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Introduction 
This study identified important neighborhood characteristics that influence investor 
interest in REO properties. In addition, it identified several aspects of the business models of 
these investors, such as their preferred methods for identifying appropriate single-family 
properties, determining appropriate acquisition prices and renovation expenses, and their 
attitudes towards rental properties. In addition, investors were asked about their expectations for 
profiting.  
The results of this study show that investors are heavily concentrated in low income and minority 
neighborhoods and in neighborhoods with older residents. Interviews with investors revealed that 
neighborhood characteristics such as crime, vacancy and blight are at times more important than 
property characteristics, and low- and moderate-income neighborhoods with decreasing 
homeownership are generally not viewed as good places for investment. Furthermore, investors 
who choose to manage single-family rental properties have a generally favorable view of the 
housing choice voucher program, indicating an opportunity to lobby for the program’s 
expansion.  
Understanding different patterns of investor activity among neighborhoods hard-hit by 
foreclosure is important for planners and policymakers seeking to mitigate the impact of a 
housing market downturn. In general, high-poverty neighborhoods and communities of color 
have experienced greater negative spillover effects of concentrated foreclosures.  
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Neighborhoods that attract investors engaging in predatory flipping or milking (Mallach, 
2014) will have a far more difficult path to recovery than will neighborhoods that attract 
investors who are interested making a profit by adding equity to properties. Planners and 
policymakers must understand how local conditions can influence investor behavior, and how 
investor behavior can contribute to or impede homeownership rates. A greater number of 
homeowners are associated with greater neighborhood stability (Rohe & Stewart, 1996), higher 
levels of property maintenance (Galster, 1987; Ioannides, 2002), and less crime (Kirk & Laub, 
2010; Lauridsen, Nannerup, & Skak, 2006). In most housing markets, homeowners drive 
neighborhood housing markets, whereas renters tend to seek shorter term tenure options and will 
often place economy over neighborhood-quality characteristics that are important to homeowners 
(Mallach, 2009). At the same time, REO units may offer opportunities for households that are 
unable to secure homeownership. If investors are purchasing these properties and turning them 
into rentals, they could provide adequate affordable rental units for families that would like to 
live in a single-family home but are not able to because of an inability to secure a mortgage.  
 
Policy Recommendations 
This study also points to specific housing policy recommendations that can lead to a more 
robust and widespread housing recovery. First, REO property transfers to owner-occupants 
should be made easier. Interviews revealed that investors have a range of methods for gathering 
information about REO properties, including using free real estate websites, paid listing services, 
and word-of-mouth from other investors. The REO time-to-sale model showed that these efforts 
appear to pay off, as investors are far more likely to purchase a property before an owner-
occupant. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, groups like the Cook County Land Bank 
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(CCLB) and Fannie Mae have implemented programs that reserve certain properties for owner-
occupants to purchase, although the properties offered by CCLB all require renovation. This 
likely prevents many potential owner-occupants from purchasing the property, due to the cost 
and other complications of property renovation. A program similar to Fannie Mae's First Look, 
which gives potential owner-occupants 20 days to purchase a property before it is made available 
to real estate investors.  
Although short sales have helped quickly transfer REO properties to owner-occupants, 
negotiating short sales with lenders remains difficult (Smith & Duda, 2009). Second, planners 
and policymakers should better understand the local market conditions and the potential for 
reoccupation of REO homes. Many of these neighborhoods offer comprehensive affordability 
options in that they are transit accessible and offer more affordable housing units. For example, 
the City of Baltimore has started a Vacants 2 Value program, which conducts a market 
assessment within high-vacancy neighborhoods and targets selected areas for comprehensive 
property renovation and resale (Vacants 2 Value, 2015). Third, policies such as code 
enforcement, land banking, and nuisance abatement can help maintain neighborhood appearance 
and stability (Mallach, 2010; Schilling, 2009), and reduce crime. These will reduce the 
detrimental effect of speculation and help stop hard-hit neighborhoods from experiencing further 
decline (Mallach, 2014). Fourth, since vacant properties can strain municipal budgets, local 
governments may find it beneficial to hold lenders accountable for municipal maintenance. A 
number of states and cities have recently enacted legislations to this effect that other 




By examining the REO single-family property sales in the Chicago MSA, this study 
showed that there are specific geographic patterns and neighborhood characteristics related to 
real estate-investor activity. Although the fallout from the foreclosure crisis will likely affect 
certain neighborhoods for years to come, a greater understanding of how, where, and why REO 
properties sell to certain parties can help us craft effective approaches to neighborhood recovery 
and revitalization. 
 
Investors and Single Family Rental Properties 
 The findings show that investors will take into account housing choice vouchers will 
influence purchasing decisions in the single-family market, particularly within distressed 
neighborhoods. The housing choice voucher program should be viewed as an important tool in 
neighborhood stabilization, as it encourages investors to purchase units that would likely 
otherwise remain vacant. In addition, housing choice vouchers can ensure reliable, long-term 
affordable housing. Furthermore, investor’s general approval of the HCV program presents a 
compelling argument for affordable housing and rental advocates to expand the program. Future 
research into real estate investors and property managers should continue to inquire about 
investor’s attitudes towards HCVs, as additional data could present an even more compelling 
case. In addition, high concentrations of REO properties in the Southland region indicate that 
thousands of households lost their home to foreclosure between 2005 and 2014. While tracking 
the residential decisions of those who have lost their home to foreclosure is difficult, there is 
evidence that many households would like to remain in their neighborhood or in a similar 
neighborhood, especially if the household contains children enrolled in a local school system 
(Martin, 2012, Petitt 2012).  
 
116 
Households who lost their home through foreclosure but would like to remain in the 
Southland region could explain the increasing rental demand in Southland for single-family 
homes that investors noted during interviews. Several municipalities in Southland are currently 
running an effective rental housing framework pilot program that include a landlord licensing 
system that revokes a landlord’s right to operate a rental business within the communities if he or 
she is associated with poor behavior. In addition, the program acknowledges that many landlords 
in this area may be new to the property management business and engagement, training, and 
incentives for properties that meet code requirements are also offered. While this program has 
not run long enough for adequate evaluation, it does address the issue small-scale investors 
moving into the property management side of the real estate industry. Three investors 
interviewed in this study had gone from no property management experience in 2010 to 
managing between one and five rentals by 2017. This indicates that there are likely many new 
landlords in the region and that a region-wide program that offers “carrots” of incentives for 
good behavior such as licensing fee rebates and reduced frequency of property inspections and 
“sticks,” or the loss of the ability to operate rental units in the region, should mitigate some of the 
negative externalities commonly associated with rental properties in a region that is likely to 
experience an increase of single-family rentals in neighborhoods that were traditionally mostly 
owner-occupied.  At the state and local level, planners should pay attention to affordable-housing 
policies that can be implemented to help ensure decent and affordable single-family rental 
housing. For example, states and local governments could create affordable lending programs 
aimed at offering long-term fixed rate mortgages at below-market prices to investors purchasing 
or renovating properties, particularly in neighborhoods that have experienced disproportionate 
numbers of REO units during the housing market downturn. Investors could be disincentiveized 
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from engaging in flipping practices with a recapture clause that would allow a state or local 
government to recover the loan amount if certain criteria are not met.  
 
Investor’s Geographic Areas and Local Government Solutions 
Interviews found that smaller investors prefer to cluster their REO property purchases, 
because of either cost savings or familiarity with a particular neighborhood, this could be helpful 
to local policymakers, community groups, and planners who are concerned with neighborhood 
housing recovery, as it could indicate potential partnerships that benefit both investors and the 
greater neighborhood.  
Several investors interviewed noted that the Neighborhood Stabilization Program’s 
criteria required investors to deviate too much from their preferred business model to be 
worthwhile, in particular because NSP was not permanent. As already mentioned, over 80 
percent of REO properties were purchased by small-scale investors. While these investors all 
engage in some similar business practices, data from this study also indicates that investors vary 
substantially in their business structure, strategies, and financial management. Although it may 
be difficult to design policy interventions that are suitable for all types of investors, future policy 
aimed at neighborhood stabilization through partnering with real estate investors should take into 
account the wide variety of ways that investors operate their businesses.  
Future policy aimed at encouraging investment in distressed neighborhoods should match 
current activities in the existing single-family investor market. In particular, planners and 
policymakers should develop flexible incentives that encourage investors to engage in long-term 
rental single-family rental properties. 
Mixed Messages: Addressing Conflicting Findings 
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It is also important to note important areas where the qualitative and quantitative findings 
appear to conflict. First, investors repeatedly noted the importance of neighborhood conditions 
when purchasing an REO property. One of the most important characteristics that investors 
avoided was excessive blight. At the same time, this study shows that investors were heavily 
active in neighborhoods that experienced high rates of REO properties. This is a contradiction 
that this study is unable to firmly resolve, although there are several aspects related to this issue 
worth exploring. It could be that investors were successful in purchasing REO properties in 
neighborhoods that were just beginning to accumulate concentrations of REO properties and 
therefore did not show signs of blight. It is also possible that investors also have different 
conceptions of blight, or perhaps two classifications for neighborhood blight—one being a 
neighborhood that is blighted but contains mostly occupied units, and the other a neighborhood 
that contains blighted but unoccupied units. Interviews revealed that investors considered a 
neighborhood’s potential future trajectory, and it is possible that many investors see blighted-
but-occupied properties indicative of a depressed or stagnant neighborhood, while blighted-but-
vacant properties indicate a neighborhood that is in flux and could recover faster than the former 
type. Future studies should examine the term “blight” within the context of different 
neighborhoods and examine if “blight” is conceptualized differently between different groups, 
such as neighborhood residents, local politicians, and real estate actors. Along with adding 
nuance to our understanding of blight, it could identify areas where residents, public officials, 
and real estate actors hold substantially different concepts of neighborhood health and stability.  
 
 
Limitations and Future Opportunities 
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Finally, it is important to note the limitations of this study. This study examined REO 
purchases within the Chicago MSA and then sought and interviewed single-family investors of 
REO properties in distressed neighborhoods within Chicago’s Southland. As one of the largest 
metropolitan areas in the United States, Chicago’s housing market is more diverse than many 
metropolitan regions in the United States, with a more diverse housing stock and greater 
opportunities for rental properties. It is possible that investors in other regions will display 
different purchasing patterns due to a less diverse housing market. In addition, the qualitative 
study was a purposive sample of investors and not intended to me representative. But the 
activities of these investors are likely common to others in neighborhoods across the United 
States and their actions have a direct impact on a neighborhood’s well-being. As such, it is 
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% African American 1.00
% Hispanic -0.36 1.00
% Over 65 0.10 -0.34 1.00
% Households in Poverty 0.49 0.14 -0.06 1.00
% Renter-Occupied 0.36 0.21 -0.09 0.65 1.00
Housing Diversity Incex -0.11 -0.20 0.04 -0.36 -0.68 1.00
Foreclosure Rate 2005-2008 0.24 0.13 -0.23 -0.02 -0.25 0.36 1.00
Employment Access Index 0.05 0.29 0.08 0.20 0.29 -0.27 -0.30 1.00
Housing Costs (% of HH budget) -0.24 -0.04 -0.01 -0.23 -0.15 -0.06 -0.28 0.19 1.00
Transportation Costs (% of household budget) -0.22 -0.37 -0.03 -0.40 -0.54 0.52 0.25 -0.78 -0.01 1.00
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--How long have you been active in real estate? 
--Have you worked for/Owned the same company the entire time? 
 
Investor business model/investor type 
--Is this your primary employment or do you do other work? 
                --(If other work) What else do you do? 
--Do you have any employees? 
                --(If yes) How many? 
--How have you grown your business/investment portfolio? 
    --What would be an ideal size? 
--What number of properties do you own at any one time (between X and Y amount)? 
--Do you primarily buy single-family units or do you also purchase other types of property? 
 
Funds/Money 
--Where does the money come from? 
--Have you ever taken out a loan? 
    --Would you ever consider a loan? 
 
--How do you calculate monthly costs? 
 
137 
--What do you consider as net profit? 
--What is value to you? 
--What do you do to put a property to productive use? 
 
Purchasing Process 
--What are the ways you find out about potential properties? 
--What do you consider when you are thinking about purchasing a house? 
--What do you think about regarding time to sell when purchasing a home? 
--What do you like to know about a neighborhood when you are purchasing a home? 
--What are important neighborhood factors you consider? 
                --Do you consider transportation access? 
                                --Roads/Freeways 
                                --Bus 
                                --Transit 
--How do you calculate monthly costs of a property? 
--Do you consider the short-term prospects (6 months-1 year) of the neighborhood when 
selecting a home to purchase? 
--What about the long-term prospects (over 1 year)? 
--What is the geographic scope that you consider when purchasing a property? 
--Have you ever purchased a home at a sheriff’s sale? 
--Would you purchase a home that needed serious renovation? 
                --(If yes) How much would you be willing to spend on renovation (in dollars or 





--How would you describe the state of the neighborhoods where you buy properties? 
--What do you think of the city services with regard to your properties? 
--Do you provide services that the city should be responsible for? 
--What about the other people in the neighborhood? 
--What do you think of the current housing market? 
--What has happened to these neighborhoods? 
    --How do you bring vacant properties back into productive use?  
--What will make these neighborhoods turn around? 
--What do other investors think of Cleveland? 
 
Tenants 
--What is a good tenant? 
--What’s your relationship with your tenants? 
--What’s your criteria for selecting tenants? 
--Do you have stable renters or high turnover rate 
    --are you satisfied with that 
--Who does the property maintenance? 
 
Landlord/Rent-to-own person 
--Tell me about rent-to own. How does that work? 
--How did you first become aware of rent-to-own? 
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--What makes someone a good rent-to-own candidate? 
 
Maintenance 
--Who does rehab? 
--Who does maintenance? 
--How do you agree on maintenance and upkeep responsibilities with the tenant? 
 
Relationships 
--Do you talk a lot to other real estate professionals? 
--What are the benefits to networking? 




APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW LOG 
Name Day Place Time of Interview 
"HH" 6/10/2017 On-Site 11-12:30am 
"BP" 6/17/2017 On-Site 2-3pm 
"PJ" 7/21/2-17 Phone 5-6pm 
"FD" 7/21/2017 On-Site 10-11:45am 
"FB" 7/24/2017 On-Site 11-12pm 
"TS" 7/25/2017 Phone 3-4pm 
"FA" 7/31/2017 On-Site 9:30-11am 
"JM" 8/3/2017 On-Site 2-3pm 
"HK" 8/11/2017 On-Site 10:30-11:30am 
"JS" 8/11/2017 On-Site 2-3:30pm 
"AS" 8/15/2017 Phone 4-4:45pm 
"TT" 8/23/2017 On-Site 11-12pm 
"JJ" 8/23/2017 On-Site 2-3:30pm 







APPENDIX D: MONTHS TO SALE FOR REO PROPERTIES AND EXPLANATORY 
FACTORS 
 
 M
on
th
s 
to
 S
al
e 
fo
r R
EO
 P
ro
pe
rt
ie
s 
an
d 
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
Fa
ct
or
s
Va
ria
bl
e
Co
ef
.
SE
St
d 
Co
ef
.
Co
ef
.
SE
St
d 
Co
ef
.
Co
ef
.
SE
St
d 
Co
ef
.
N
ei
gh
bo
rh
oo
d 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s
%
 A
fr
ic
an
 A
m
er
ic
an
-0
.1
17
**
*
0.
02
5
-0
.0
13
1
-2
.4
55
**
*
0.
07
6
-2
.4
76
31
-0
.3
71
**
*
0.
04
7
-0
.0
99
%
 H
is
pa
ni
c
-0
.0
38
0.
03
0
0.
00
1
2
-1
.5
34
**
*
0.
05
1
-1
.5
53
32
-0
.5
98
**
*
0.
05
1
-0
.3
17
%
 O
ve
r 6
5
-0
.2
15
**
*
0.
08
1
-0
.0
18
3
-1
.0
13
**
*
0.
04
2
-1
.0
31
33
-0
.6
29
**
*
0.
05
2
-0
.3
41
%
 H
ou
se
ho
ld
s i
n 
Po
ve
rt
y
-0
.0
99
0.
06
3
-0
.0
07
4
-0
.7
53
**
*
0.
03
9
-0
.7
69
34
-0
.7
04
**
*
0.
05
4
-0
.4
08
%
 R
en
te
r-
O
cc
up
ie
d
0.
02
3
0.
04
1
0.
00
8
5
-0
.5
04
**
*
0.
03
6
-0
.5
17
35
-0
.8
06
**
*
0.
05
7
-0
.5
04
Ho
us
in
g 
Di
ve
rs
ity
 In
de
x
0.
04
8
*
0.
02
9
0.
02
1
6
-0
.2
10
**
*
0.
03
3
-0
.2
18
36
-0
.8
66
**
*
0.
05
9
-0
.5
59
Fo
re
cl
os
ur
e 
Ra
te
 (l
og
)
-0
.0
40
**
*
0.
00
9
-0
.0
31
7
-0
.0
82
**
0.
03
2
-0
.0
84
37
-0
.9
77
**
*
0.
06
2
-0
.6
64
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t A
cc
es
s I
nd
ex
-0
.0
18
**
*
0.
00
4
-0
.0
23
8
-0
.0
01
0.
03
2
0.
00
6
38
-0
.9
09
**
*
0.
06
1
-0
.5
90
In
ne
r R
in
g 
Su
bu
rb
-0
.0
83
**
*
0.
01
6
-0
.0
68
9
0.
19
7
**
*
0.
03
1
0.
21
4
39
-1
.0
07
**
*
0.
06
4
-0
.6
83
O
ut
er
 R
in
g 
Su
bu
rb
-0
.0
54
**
*
0.
02
0
-0
.0
52
10
0.
20
8
**
*
0.
03
1
0.
23
5
40
-1
.0
69
**
*
0.
06
6
-0
.7
39
Ex
ur
ba
n 
Su
bu
rb
 0.
02
9
0.
02
6
0.
02
6
11
0.
18
8
**
*
0.
03
1
0.
22
6
41
-1
.2
56
**
*
0.
07
2
-0
.9
21
Un
in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 A
re
a
0.
35
7
**
*
0.
02
7
0.
09
1
12
0.
25
6
**
*
0.
03
1
0.
30
5
42
-1
.1
97
**
*
0.
07
0
-0
.8
58
M
ed
ia
n 
Ho
us
in
g 
Co
st
-1
.7
34
**
*
0.
20
7
-0
.0
20
13
0.
33
7
**
*
0.
03
1
0.
39
9
43
-1
.3
93
**
*
0.
07
7
-1
.0
51
M
ed
ia
n 
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
ti
on
 C
os
t
-0
.5
11
**
*
0.
52
7
-0
.0
09
14
0.
27
4
**
*
0.
03
2
0.
34
9
44
-1
.2
82
**
*
0.
07
3
-0
.9
35
15
0.
20
8
**
*
0.
03
3
0.
29
4
45
-1
.3
23
**
*
0.
07
5
-0
.9
72
Co
ns
ta
nt
-2
.5
56
**
*
0.
13
5
16
0.
23
5
**
*
0.
03
3
0.
33
5
46
-1
.4
23
**
*
0.
07
9
-1
.0
68
17
0.
26
3
**
*
0.
03
3
0.
37
7
47
-1
.6
04
**
*
0.
08
6
-1
.2
44
18
0.
15
0
**
*
0.
03
4
0.
27
7
48
-1
.5
43
**
*
0.
08
4
-1
.1
81
19
0.
13
9
**
*
0.
03
5
0.
27
9
49
-1
.6
18
**
*
0.
08
7
-1
.2
53
20
0.
13
5
**
*
0.
03
5
0.
28
9
50
-1
.9
15
**
*
0.
10
0
-1
.5
47
21
0.
04
5
0.
03
7
0.
21
2
51
-1
.8
46
**
*
0.
09
7
-1
.4
76
22
-0
.0
33
0.
03
8
0.
14
7
52
-2
.0
06
**
*
0.
10
5
-1
.6
34
23
-0
.0
25
0.
03
8
0.
16
6
53
-2
.0
12
**
*
0.
10
6
-1
.6
38
24
-0
.1
36
**
*
0.
04
0
0.
06
6
54
-2
.3
19
**
*
0.
12
3
-1
.9
42
25
-0
.1
47
**
*
0.
04
1
0.
06
7
55
-2
.3
30
**
*
0.
12
3
-1
.9
51
26
-0
.1
53
**
*
0.
04
1
0.
07
1
56
-2
.6
15
**
*
0.
14
2
-2
.2
35
27
-0
.2
22
**
*
0.
04
3
0.
01
3
57
-2
.3
70
**
*
0.
12
6
-1
.9
87
28
-0
.4
00
**
*
0.
04
6
-0
.1
55
58
-2
.5
16
**
*
0.
13
6
-2
.1
32
29
-0
.3
93
**
*
0.
04
6
-0
.1
37
59
-2
.8
02
**
*
0.
15
6
-2
.4
16
30
-0
.4
28
**
*
0.
04
7
-0
.1
64
60
-2
.6
25
**
*
0.
14
3
-2
.2
38
M
on
th
s t
o 
se
ll
M
on
th
s t
o 
se
ll
